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ABSTRACT 
For centuries, Aristotle’s ethos has been a crucial component of persuasive 
rhetoric, with flagrant violations of character extinguishing the credibility of speakers and 
rendering their messages ineffective. However, the 2016 US presidential election 
challenged the rhetorical value of good character and left voters unable to articulate 
feelings about perceived moral transgressions. In some ways, this inability to express 
what bothered many is tied to the various constraints of the first-year writing classroom, 
where instructors often oversimplify definitions of ethos in a way that removes a facet 
known as aretê—a concept defined as moral virtue and one especially beneficial for 
navigating morally complex and controversial conversations.  
This study argues for a revival of aretê in our classrooms as a way of helping 
students engage in and explore their own questions of morality, character, and ethos. 
Utilizing revised conceptions of ethos and aretê that incorporate modern notions of moral 
virtue, this study analyzed transcripts of the three presidential debates to quantify how 
and when Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump employed morally loaded language. The 
results of the lexical analysis surfaced a reduced moral vocabulary, which illustrates the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of ethos and a larger aretiac lexicon in our 
classroom. What this research advocates for is not that we anchor every iteration of ethos 
in moral virtue, but rather that alternative conceptions are invited into the classroom as a 
way of helping students enact new identities and participate in new spheres.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
7 October 2016 
Just two days before the second presidential debate, the Washington Post released 
a video of a 2005 conversation between Republican candidate Donald Trump and 
television host Billy Bush as they arrived on the set of Days of Our Lives, where Trump 
was making a cameo. The two men were speaking on an Access Hollywood bus when a 
hot microphone caught their conversation. In the audio, Trump discusses a failed attempt 
at seducing an unknown woman. “I moved on her, actually,” he tells Bush, “I moved on 
her, and I failed. I’ll admit it.” He continues: 
I did try and fuck her…. I moved on her very heavily in fact I took her out 
furniture shopping. She wanted to get some furniture. I said I'll show you where 
they have some nice furniture. I moved on her like a bitch, but I couldn't get there. 
And she was married. 
Later in the video, Trump and Bush see Arianne Zucker, the actress who was waiting to 
escort the pair into the soap opera set. Trump says: 
I better use some Tic Tacs just in case I start kissing her. You know, I’m 
automatically attracted to beautiful—I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. 
Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do 
anything…. Grab ’em by the pussy. You can do anything. (qtd. in Fahrenthold) 
The vulgar and unsettling contents of the video provoked strong reactions by media, 
politicians, and citizens throughout the country and across the political spectrum. On 
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Twitter, opponent Hillary Clinton wrote, “This is horrific. We cannot allow this man to 
become president” (@HillaryClinton). Her running mate, Sen. Tim Kaine said, “It makes 
me sick to my stomach” (Kaine). House Speaker Paul Ryan was also “sickened” by 
Trump’s comments, saying “women are to be championed and revered, not objectified” 
(qtd. in Sherman). Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus said, “No 
women should ever be described in these terms or talked about in this manner. Ever” 
(qtd. in Harrington). Two days after the video’s release, nearly three dozen Republican 
politicians called for Trump to withdraw from the ticket, including 10 senators, 16 
representatives, 2 governors, 1 former Secretary of State, and two former Republican 
presidential candidates (Blake). 
Prior to the video’s release, I had dedicated a year and half to the study 
of ethos and character, and I knew that I was looking at the nail in the coffin for Trump. 
He had survived calling Mexican immigrants criminals1; insulting the appearance of a 
female opponent2; encouraging rally violence3; declining to disavow racists4; and 
                                                 
1 Donald Trump addressed Mexican immigrants on 16 June 2015 when he first 
announced his presidential bid. He stated, “When Mexico sends its people, they're not 
sending their best. . . . They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” 
2 Paul Solotaroff, writing for Rolling Stones, was invited to fly back with Trump from a 
rally in Hampton, New Hampshire on 14 August 2015. According to Solotaroff while 
watching the news, the camera pans to Carly Fiorina at which time Trump cries, “Look at 
that face! . . .Would anyone vote for that? Can you imagine that, the face of our 
next president?!” Trump continues, “I mean, she's a woman, and I'm not s'posedta say 
bad things, but really, folks, come on. Are we serious?" (Solotaroff)  
3 At a Rally in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Trump described how security warned him there may 
be people in the audience with tomatoes. At the stand Trump instructed his audience “that 
if you see somebody getting ready to throw a tomato, knock the crap out of them, would 
you? Seriously. Okay? Just knock the hell—I promise you, I will pay the legal fees.” 
4 In February 2016, Donald Trump declined to disavow notable white supremacists like 
David Duke (Kessler). 
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insinuating that an opponent’s father was involved with the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy5. He had continually and surprisingly endured rhetorical choices that would 
have doomed any other candidate, but this tape was too egregious of a violation of 
character to survive. Given all that I had learned about rhetoric and importance of 
character, I knew it would only be a few weeks before Trump would rescind his 
candidacy. 
*          *          * 
1 November 2016 
Leading up to the 2016 presidential election, I became fascinated with the website 
FiveThrityEight.com, which famously called 48 out of 50 states correctly in the 2008 
presidential race and 50 out of 50 states in the 2012 race. I had never visited the website 
before then, but I found myself checking the site every day to see the latest poll numbers 
and predictions. After both parties’ conventions, the Democratic Party Presidential 
Candidate, Hillary R. Clinton and the Republican Party Presidential Candidate Donald J. 
Trump were given nearly identical odds of securing the presidency—as close as .2% 
dividing them. Two weeks later, Clinton surged to nearly a 90% chance. The odds would 
fluctuate here and there, but the polls consistently predicted a significant victory for the 
Democratic candidate. Just a few weeks before the election, it seemed like a forgone 
conclusion: Hillary Clinton would be the next president of the United States. 
The fascination soon turned to an obsession as I started checking the site multiple 
times a day. Nate Silver, the site’s editor-in-chief, gave Clinton a 71% chance, but also 
                                                 
5 Trump insinuated that Ted Cruz’s father Rafael Cruz was involved in the assassination 
of John F. Kennedy during a phone interview with Fox News on 1 March 2016 
(McCaskill). 
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listed 15 states to watch: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Looking at the map, New Hampshire was pale blue, 
representing a slim lead for Clinton. Florida, Nevada, and North Carolina were several 
shades lighter but blue nonetheless. Iowa and Ohio were pale red—she might be able to 
flip those states, but it’ll take a big effort. The rest of the states are solidly blue or red, 
and I didn’t anticipate them swinging too much either way. 
2 November 
Florida and North Carolina both go red—light red—and Nevada can’t decide 
itself. It looks maybe red but also maybe blue. Clinton’s probability drops five percentage 
points to 66.7%. 
4 November 
Florida and North Carolina swing back blue. An hour later, Utah and Arizona get 
a little redder. 
5 November 
Florida and North Carolina go back red. On the map, New Hampshire gets a thin 
black outline, which I learn means the state is being contested. 
6 November, 10:47 a.m. 
Nothing changes. Pennsylvania gets a little bluer, and Iowa gets a little redder. 
6 November, 7:16 p.m. 
South Dakota and Pennsylvania both get a little redder. Clinton sits at 64.2%. 
7 November 10:39 a.m. 
  
 
5 
Clinton jumps a few points to a 66% chance of winning. New Hampshire turns a 
shade or two bluer, and the outline switches back to white. 
7 November, 11:32 a.m. 
No real change. Ohio goes dark red, and New Mexico and Pennsylvania turn a 
few shades redder. 
7 November, 5:15 p.m. 
Despite the recent rash of red states, Clinton sits at a 67.9% chance. Both Florida 
and North Carolina go blue—light blue, but still blue. Pennsylvania gets bluer. Maybe 
I’m just imagining it, but I think Ohio’s red gets just a little bit lighter. 
7 November, 6:00 p.m. 
Clinton has a 68.5% chance. 
7 November, 6:30 p.m. 
68.1% chance for Clinton. New Mexico gets just a touch darker shade of blue. In 
its first real change in over a week, Minnesota gets a black outline. 
7 November, 10:00 p.m. 
69.5% chance. Colorado goes darker blue. Nevada is now a solid blue too. An 
hour or so later, Arizona gets a little lighter. She might not flip Iowa or Ohio, but if she 
takes Arizona, it’s all over. 
8 November, 10:00 a.m. 
71.9%. North Carolina and Florida go darker blue. Iowa gets a little lighter. 
Arizona stays stubborn and won’t turn blue. 
8 November, 10:27 a.m. 
71.4%. 
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8 November, 11:03 a.m. 
No change. 
8 November, 11:49 a.m. 
No change. 
8 November, 1:31p.m. 
No change 
8 November, 2:45 p.m. 
No change. That’s it. 
Annie and I meet on campus to vote at the Student Union Building. I have an 
electric bill to prove our residency tucked into my jacket pocket and a sticky note 
attached to my index finger with reminders for the local elections. We stand in line 
holding hands. Annie says she loves voting, but she wishes we were at an elementary 
school. “Don’t you think we should be at grade school?” she says, “I’ve only ever voted 
at grade schools.” A woman with thick, black glasses looks over our electric bill, asks us 
to fill out a new voter registration, and then gives us our ballots. I share the sticky note 
with Annie, and she shares it with our friends June and Carson, who were voting in Idaho 
for the first time. After submitting my ballot, one of the volunteers asks for my full name. 
I tell him, and he replies, “Skyler James Meeks has voted.” Then he hands me an “I 
Voted” sticker and offers a bowl a fun-sized candy bars. I wait for my wife, June, and 
Carson to turn in their ballots while I unwrap a Twix bar. 
Annie and I head over to Mark’s just after 6 p.m., and he already has MSNBC on. 
I set a red and blue layer cake with white frosting on the kitchen counter, while Annie 
slides four bottles of Martinelli’s sparkling cider into the fridge. Ian and LaDonne come 
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through the door a few minutes later, carrying two cookie sheets of caramel popcorn. On 
one sheet, the popcorn has been dyed red and shaped into a donkey. On the other, is a 
blue elephant. By the time we get settled in, Trump is already projected to be leading 19 
electoral votes to 3, with him anticipated to win South Carolina, West Virginia, and 
Alabama. It’s unsettling, but not surprising. The southern states are the first to come in, 
and Clinton is expected to make up major ground when more of the northern states come 
in. 
By 6:30 p.m., Clinton has pulled ahead in the projections, leading 75 to 66 
electoral votes, with Florida and North Carolina “too close to call.” The states are grayed 
out on MSNBC’s enormous map of the nation, and they will stay that way for some time. 
For the next hour, we shove handfuls of sticky popcorn into our mouths as state after 
state after state is called for Trump. Ian sits closest to the TV, tapping and retapping his 
finger on an interactive map he’s pulled up on his iPad. He switches states from red to 
blue and back to red again. The map lets him test hypothetical scenarios. What if Trump 
wins Ohio? What if Clinton wins Ohio. What if Trump wins Florida?  
We don’t have to wait long as just after 8 p.m., Ohio goes to Trump. It’s the first 
big victory of the night for him. By 9 p.m., my home of Oregon goes to Clinton, which 
surprises no one. She’s leading 209 to 172, and she only needs 61 more electoral votes to 
clench the election. The problem is Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania have 
joined Florida and North Carolina as states that are too close to call. FiveThirtyEight said 
these states were solid, and now we don’t know. 
The next five states are all called for Trump—North Carolina, Utah, Iowa, 
Georgia, and Florida. Suddenly, Trump’s not putting up a good fight, he’s leading—244 
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to 209. We’ve all stopped eating, and Ian has one hand on his forehead while the other 
taps the states on his iPad resting in his lap. It’s strange, but the people on TV aren’t even 
pretending to understand the results as they come in. There is a round table of experts, 
both Republican and Democrat, and neither group knows what to say. “I’ve never seen 
anything like it,” one says. “None of the polls predicted this,” says another. 
The Clinton camp are now pinning their hopes of victory on Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin. We all watch as someone keeps zooming in on counties in 
Michigan, saying that votes in urban centers are still coming in. Clinton still has a chance. 
But then Pennsylvania falls—one of Clinton’s firewall states. And now Trump is up to 
264 votes. He only needs six votes, and with Wisconsin, Michigan, and Arizona still 
unaccounted for, any one of them could tip the scale. There is a sinking feeling in my 
chest. Like my lungs have turned to wet sand. It feels as though someone has stolen 
something from me. I feel betrayed in some way. I knew what the polls said, I knew what 
the rhetoric said, and now this. Ian has long put away his iPad. Annie, Mark, and 
LaDonne are talking about something, but their voices feel too far away to understand. 
I’m stuck inside my head, trying to reason through what is happening. Just 
after midnight, Trump captures Wisconsin and its 10 electoral votes, pushing him over 
the threshold needed to become the next president. 
This is a man who called a large number of Mexican immigrants criminals and 
rapists, and he won. 
He insinuated that a debate moderator was treating him unfairly because she was 
menstruating, and he won. 
He imitated the disabling condition of a reporter, and he won. 
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He stated that he could grab women by their genitals, and he won. 
Soon after, Ian and LaDonne say their good byes and head home. Ian jokes that if 
he knew how the night would have gone, he wouldn’t have made everyone get together. 
LaDonne says that knowing how the night went, she’s glad that we got together. Annie 
and I collect our uneaten cake and the unopened bottles of sparkling cider before we head 
home. The three of us are still trying to make sense of the night. Annie asks me if I’m 
okay. “Yeah, I’m fine. I’m just a little confused,” I say. “The thing is, I’ve been 
researching morality for months, and I was convinced it meant something. Turns out, it 
doesn’t make a difference.”  
* * * 
Throughout the rhetorical timeline, ethos has been a key element of the artistic 
appeals as it helps the speaker display authority and credibility to the audience (Farrell). 
Aristotle was one of the first to categorize ethos as an artistic appeal, and his Rhetoric 
provides a fundamental understanding for the notion of persuasion through character. In 
book 1, chapter 2, Aristotle presents three modes of technical proofs: those that “depend 
on the person character of the speaker,” those that “put the audience in a certain frame of 
mind” in the auditor’s disposition,” and those that depend on “proof or apparent proof, 
provided by the words of the speech itself” (1356a1-4). And while Aristotle encourages 
orators to consider each of the three modes, his concern is with the first, that which 
emphasizes the speaker’s ethos. Offering a definition, Aristotle writes, “we believe good 
men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question 
is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.” An 
audience more readily believes a speaker who they feel they can trust, which is why 
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Aristotle declares ethos as “the most effective means of persuasion he possesses” 
(1356a5-13).  
He attributes special weight to this technical proof when “opinions are divided” 
and “exact certainty is impossible” and even chastises those who assume that “personal 
goodness…contributes nothing to [the] power of persuasion.” Having ethos suggests that 
an orator possesses qualities that make listeners more inclined to believe a speaker. As 
Aristotle notes, “we believe good men more fully and more readily than others,” 
especially when pathos or logos fail to accurately describe the contributing factors. For 
Aristotle, effective rhetoricians are those who demonstrate the virtuousness required to 
journey through the rhetorical gray areas “only because character can go where logic [and 
emotion] cannot” (Garver 92).  
Cicero continued to advocate for Aristotle’s good character as a means of 
persuasion in the study of rhetoric. In his De Oratore, Cicero states that failing to 
consider human conduct and a speaker’s ethos “shall leave the orator no sphere wherein 
to attain greatness” (1.15.68). Not only is character a component of rhetoric, it is a 
necessary element if we wish to establish great rhetoricians.  
Quintilian furthers this idea, defining rhetoric as “a good man6 skilled in 
speaking” (12.11.9). For Quintilian, who speaking is just as important as what is being 
spoken, and he explores the idea of building a better speaker in his Institutio Oratoria. 
Specifically, in Book 12, Quintilian outlines why an immoral man cannot be a great 
rhetorician—“For it is impossible to regard those men as gifted with intelligence who on 
                                                 
6 This research interprets Quintilian’s use of “man” as a gender-neutral reference to all 
speakers regardless of gender identity. 
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being offered the choice between the two paths of virtue and of vice choose the latter.” 
He then justifies why a moral man can be—“But if the quality which is usually termed 
goodness is to be found even in quite ordinary advocates, why should not the orator…be 
no less perfect in character than in excellence of speech?” (12.1.24). Quintilian, 
extending the work of previous rhetoricians, includes morality in his elevation of the 
rhetorical practice and the rhetorician. Quintilian so clearly and closely ties the moral 
virtue of a speaker to his or her ability to practice effective rhetoric that the two are 
essentially mutually exclusive. One cannot be “skilled in speaking” without first being 
“good”—it goes against the very definition of what rhetoric is.  
If good character is such a crucial component of persuasive rhetoric, then flagrant 
violations of it should extinguish the credibility of the speaker and render his or her 
message ineffective. And yet, Trump continued his campaign after the October 7th tape 
where he bragged about sexually assaulting women. On his website, Trump issued an 
apology that labelled his words as “locker room banter” and “a private conversation that 
took place many years ago.” When asked about the tape at the second presidential debate, 
Trump again reiterated that his statements were locker room talk, saying, “it’s just words, 
folks. It’s just words.” Given ethos’ deeply rooted presence and prominence in rhetoric, 
Trump’s ability to dismiss such violations of character demonstrates a worrying disregard 
for moral virtue when selecting the highest office in the land. His ability to not only 
continue his campaign and but also win the presidency signals something deeply 
troubling about the state of rhetoric today: ethos—the good man speaking well—is in 
crisis. 
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To some degree, there’s validity in Trump’s argument. As Saussure would argue, 
his words were just signifiers connected to concepts, and the words themselves do 
nothing. They sit in the air as empty strings of sounds until we assign meaning to them. 
But even then, that meaning can’t physically do anything on its own. In theory, there’s 
validity to that argument. However, words can never be just words, and we’ve known this 
for quite some time. Words shape our perceptions and change the way we interact with 
one another. Words can be soft, and they can be dangerous, and sometimes they are both. 
They console us after loss, and they amuse us in rhymes. They get stuck in our head, and 
we find ourselves singing Lady Gaga lyrics until we fall asleep. Language and words are 
tools that we have used for centuries, and regardless of their immateriality, they have 
very real power. And so when someone uses abhorrent or marginalizing language, 
whether in a locker room or at a podium, it crushes the air out of my lungs and makes my 
blood go muddy, cold, and heavy. I’m left staring into the eyes of my students, my 
friends, my wife, while I shrug my shoulders without the words to navigate these deeply 
rhetorical waters. 
In some ways, this inability to express what bothers us is tied to the first-year 
writing classroom and the way instructors introduce rhetoric. So often, the artistic appeals 
are an entry point for instructors, as students readily grapple with simplified versions of 
ethos, pathos, and logos. However, given the various constraints of the classroom, these 
profound elements of rhetoric are often oversimplified. The working definition of ethos 
in particular is often condensed to credibility of sources, which removes, among other 
things, a facet of moral virtue that Aristotle originally included in his conception of ethos. 
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This facet, known as aretê, can aid students as they participate in increasingly more 
morally complex and controversial conversations.  
And given the way that speakers like Trump currently challenge the rhetorical 
value of character, there is no more urgent a time to familiarize students with moral 
virtue. To guard against emotional manipulation, we help students identify the ways in 
which speakers invoke and affect their feelings. Shouldn’t we similarly help them 
recognize how and when their morality is being influenced, given that the stakes are 
equally significant, if not more so. What we need now more than ever is a revival of aretê 
in our classroom conversations as a way of helping students engage in and explore their 
own questions of morality, character, and ethos. This thesis is an attempt to begin this 
revival.  
The second chapter tracks conversations and conceptions of ethos to show both 
what has led to the devaluing of character in contemporary discourse and what attempts 
have been made to restore it. The chapter also provides a theoretical tracing of aretê that 
demonstrates how first-year writing instructors might update the appeal to consider 
current notions of morality. Ultimately, this chapter advocates for revising current 
conceptions ethos and aretê by incorporating principles of Johnathan Haidt and Craig 
Joseph’s Moral Foundations Theory, which establishes for five distinct categories of 
morality. This updating develops a more robust vocabulary and sophisticated tool to use 
when engaging students in aretiac discussions.  
The third chapter utilizes this new conceptualization of ethos to analyze the 2016 
presidential debates between Clinton and Trump. The chapter first outlines the 
methodology for the lexical analysis that incorporates both the Linguistic Inquiry and 
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Word Count and the Moral Foundations Dictionary to quantify how and when speakers 
employ morally loaded language. The chapter then explores three findings from this 
study that include moral concentration versus moral volume, peaking moral loading, and 
specific versus general morality. The chapter shows that morally loaded language was 
present in the debates and that both Clinton and Trump used morally loaded language to 
discuss America’s most pressing problems, signaling not just the potential of aretiac 
proficiency but also the necessity of it. 
The final chapter begins with a rhetorical analysis of the debates that 
demonstrates how both candidates employ complex techniques to build their own 
character while also diminishing the perceived moral virtue of his or her opponent. The 
chapter then revisits the previous findings to surface a reduced moral vocabulary that 
suggests the presence of a moral-immoral binary. This binary illustrates the need to 
provide students with a more nuanced understanding of ethos and a larger aretiac 
vocabulary. Ultimately, what this research advocates for is not that every iteration of 
ethos is anchored in moral virtue, but rather that alternative conceptions are invited into 
the classroom as a way to enrich our understanding of aretê and help students enact new 
identities and participate in new spheres. 
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 CHAPTER 2: ETHOS, ARETÊ, AND MORALITY 
To develop the foundation for our work, this chapter provides a theoretical 
overview of three concepts: ethos, aretê, and morality. The review of ethos provides both 
the post-modern philosophies that lead to this crisis of character and the current 
conversations that exist in that void, namely scholars who advocate for either a complete 
reconceptualization of ethos or for a revival of individual components. The review aretê 
shows us that, contrary to arguments against it, presented character, in the form of aretê, 
has always been a crucial component of ethos and that a updated conception of aretê 
gives us a more sophisticated tool to use when analyzing the complex rhetoric of current 
public discourse. And finally, this chapter connects aretê to modern conceptions of moral 
virtue as a way of refining the component with current models of morality, specifically 
Haidt and Joseph’s Moral Foundations Theory. Linking ethos to the MFT provides 
rhetoric and composition instructors with a more nuanced and robust language to use 
when describing rhetorical performances of character—a framework that students can 
then use in their own inquiries into morality and rhetoric.  
Exigence of the Crisis 
While rhetoric has often included character as a part of its study, there are a 
number of scholars who argue against its presence as an appeal. The main objection is 
that character and moral virtue will always be accompanied by moral relativism, a 
concept that emphasizes the unstable and fluid nature of truth and in turn morality. These 
voices argue that the complications arising from the impermanence of character will 
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always outweigh any sort of benefit that an inclusion of character might add. These 
conversations have prompted an aversion to morality, where nearly no conception of 
ethos includes facets of moral virtue that were once a crucial element of the appeal.  
One of the earliest examples of rhetoric and moral relativism is Dissoi Logoi. And 
though little is known about the author of this text, Dissoi Logoi explores a series of nine 
pairings, which compare and contrast various characteristics of thought and conduct. 
Some of the initial pairings include, “On Good and Bad”; “On Seemly and Shameful”; 
and “On Just and Unjust.” Each make the argument that, essentially, any event can be 
viewed as one thing for one person and the opposite thing for another person. For 
example, “On Good and Bad” illustrates how death is bad for a family, but good for the 
undertaker (155). This work seems firmly anchored in the sophist belief that there is no 
absolute truth, but rather a relative truth based on circumstances. This sophist school of 
thought is at the origin of rhetoric, and almost directly contradicts Plato’s ideas on 
absolute truth, and in turn, the inclusion of morality. 
Later, Renaissance rhetorician Peter Ramus also takes issue with the inclusion of 
moral virtue in rhetoric. Ramus specifically argues that Quintilian cannot say that rhetoric 
is the good man speaking well when being good or moral is outside of the rules of 
Quintilian’s art (86). Ramus shapes his argument, saying:  
Quintilian decrees that there are five parts to the art of rhetoric…invention, 
arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. He thinks there are no more and no 
less. Yet in no one of these parts does he fit in the moral philosophy which he 
now attributes to rhetoric.  
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Just as a mathematician must abide by the rules of his art, so too must orators, thus 
leaving character outside of the discourse. And because Ramus feels it is impossible to 
include morality in rhetoric, he focuses instead on the use of dialectic, a discipline he 
prizes above moral virtue because of its concern with the mind and reason. 
This view of rhetoric as not having moral characteristics is reiterated by 
Nietzsche, who argues that morality is not a reality but rather a metaphor. In The Gay 
Science, the philosopher defines morality as, “merely a sign language” and moral 
evaluations as “symptoms…which betray the process of physiological prosperity” (qtd. in 
Knobe and Leiter 89). In Twilight of the Idols, he states morality is merely an 
interpretation of certain phenomena—more precisely a misinterpretation” (qtd. in 
Hussain 159). For Nietzsche, morality and the pursuit of it do not belong in rhetoric 
because there is no such thing (Nietzsche 1174). And while the philosopher takes issue 
with morality’s reality, he does not question its influence: 
Truth are illusions we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have 
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force…. Thus, to express it 
morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd 
and in a manner binding upon everyone. Now man of course forgets that this is 
the way things stand for him. Thus he lies in the manner indicated, unconsciously 
and in accordance with habits which are centuries old; and precisely by means of 
this unconsciousness and forgetfulness he arrives at his sense of truth. From that 
sense…there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth. (1174) 
For Nietzsche, the goal of rhetoric is not to discover truth, but to understand moral 
impulse and harness the power that has driven it through time. Michel Foucault extends 
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Nietzsche’s work, calling into question humanity’s “will to truth,” saying that this 
tendency has created several mistaken beliefs (22). The philosophies of Nietzsche mark a 
significant decrease in morality’s prominence in rhetoric, and other postmodern 
philosophers accept this idea and continuously downplay the presence of morality.  
A key post-modern critique of ethos stems from the nature of the self. Marshall 
Alcorn outlines two main two traditions regarding the self: a stable, essential self and a 
fluid, shifting self. In the tradition of the stable self, also known as the Cartesian self, 
discourse is seen as a way to uncover one’s essential character. And by extension, 
speeches, essays, and other forms of communication are a way to uncover an intrinsic set 
of moral values. Conversely, tradition of the fluid or postmodern self views discourse as a 
way to construct the self. If we compose our character through a collection of social 
roles, habits, and conventions, there is no essential character—only a series of 
“component systems, deprived of its status as source and master of meaning” (Culler 33). 
In the postmodern thought, the self is contingent on construction, making it nearly 
impossible to have any conversation about stable or unified ethos.  
This is a conversation that reaches back to Plato and the sophists, who had similar 
dividing lines in ancient Greece. At the beginning of the rhetorical tradition, Plato 
establishes the pursuit of absolute truth as a key component of a speaker’s character. This 
drastically contrasts the beliefs of the sophists and their interest in conditional—
sometimes paradoxical—truth (Wardy 6). Plato’s ideas, it seems, would align more 
closely with the Cartesian self and the pursuit of absolute ideals as a way to judge one’s 
character. Conversely, the sophists align more closely with a postmodern school of 
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thought, with many exploring how conditional arguments can destabilize conventional 
truths (Jarratt 59). 
These critiques have complicated discussions of ethos for many centuries, and 
rightly so. Foucault, Derrida, and others have diminished the value of character, while 
other scholars have emphasized the impossibility of consensus in explorations of moral 
virtue. However, this post-modern turn has created a void in the classroom. The 
complexity of ethos-centered conversations often require resources that instructors 
simply don’t have, leading many to forgo morality completely and opt instead for notions 
of source credibility that are more readily packaged for the first-year writing classroom. 
Our students’ abilities to engage in examinations of character are suffering because of 
convenience. Classrooms should be ideal environments where students can engage in 
difficult conversations, and yet they are not. Given the void created, we have an 
opportunity to reintroduce character into the classroom and restore aretê as a 
foundational element of ethos. Doing so does sacrifice time, topics, and other resources 
of the first-year classroom, but the compensation is students who can more confidently 
and accurately articulate the morally complex and controversial conversations they find 
themselves in. 
Revitalizing Ethos 
Incorporating ethos into the classroom begins with an understanding of its lineage 
since its history allows us to see how other scholars have argued for character’s place in 
rhetorical discussions. This review of ethos is divided into two sections. One begins with 
Aristotle’s original conception of ethos that allows us to see character’s value at the 
beginning of rhetorical study itself, and the other reviews attempts by contemporary 
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scholars to fill the void created by the post-modern aversion to morality. Considering the 
classroom’s familiarity with Aristotle’s conception of ethos as well as the ability to 
update ethos with current notions of moral virtue, this research emphasizes current 
scholarship that advocates for a revival of aretê in ethos,  
In reviewing the origin of ethos we see how Aristotle intended appeals to 
character to be used in rhetoric. The Greek rhetorician emphasized ethos’s ability to 
persuade “where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided” (1356a5-13). In 
book 1, chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ethos is defined broadly as appeals that “depend 
on the personal character of the speaker” (1356a1-4). Offering a full definition, Aristotle 
writes: 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so 
spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and 
more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and 
absolutely true. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by 
what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins 
to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatise on rhetoric, that the 
personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of 
persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective 
means of persuasion he possesses. (1356a5-13) 
In book 2, Aristotle addresses the specific components of ethos, saying:  
There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character—
the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: 
good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. False statements and bad advice 
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are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false 
opinion through want of good sense; or they for a true opinion, but because of 
their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both 
sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in 
consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the 
only possible cases. It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of 
these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience. (1378a6-20) 
The basic thought has not changed: when a speaker appears to have “good sense, good 
moral character, and goodwill,” an audience is more likely to believe his or her words. In 
the above passage, Aristotle is clarifying what makes ethos persuasive, and he further 
establishes the tripartite components of character and a credible orator. Additionally, one 
component by itself is not persuasive, but rather all three working components used in 
combination. And if just one of the components is lacking, orators are inclined to give 
erroneous advice.  
Aristotle’s ethos was not his own original conception; ideas of good character 
trace back to the very beginning of Greek literature. Elements of the Aristotelian triad are 
present in Homer’s Iliad, and later Plato’s Gorgias also recognizes the rhetorical power 
of a speaker’s wisdom, virtue, and goodwill (Fortenbaugh 211). Yet Aristotle presents the 
most detailed conceptualization of persuasion through character, a character that makes 
one “worthy of belief” (226).  
When Aristotle introduces ethos, he develops a notion of persuasion through 
character that, “aims at giving the unemotional and impartial auditor good reason for 
paying attentions and possibly deciding in favor of the speaker” (Fortenbaugh 228). And 
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despite being “one of the most enigmatic concepts in the entire lexicon,” it is ethos that 
inspires confidence in an orator’s own character and helps us navigate morally delicate 
situations, “where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided” (Farrell; 
Aristotle 1356a8). Ultimately, it is ethos that speaks to the humanness of the individual, 
reaching places that even the most rigorous logic cannot go. 
Contemporary Conversations Surrounding Character 
As of late, three movements have directed the discourse: one where scholars 
challenge the existence of ethos (Alcorn; Culler); a second where scholars redefine the 
attributes of ethos (Hart; Hovland, Janis, and Kelly); and a third where scholars restore 
the attributes of ethos (Corder; Yoos). While there is merit to each discussion, ultimately 
this section will expound on the third movement—where scholars seek to restore the 
characteristics of ethos—showing how current scholarship can update our understanding 
of ethos and provide a lexis to use when analyzing the presence and employment of 
moral appeals within a text.  
Previous conversations surrounding ethos concentrate on authenticity of 
character, asking whether or not it was possible to distinguish the speaker’s presented 
character from his or her actual character (Aristotle; Yoos). Since most oratorical 
occasions allow speakers to obscure their real character, these examinations of ethos lead 
us to a complex conversation of the nature of the self. Alcorn’s work posits that any 
theory of ethos “needs to be grounded in a relatively clear, but also relatively complex 
understanding of the self” (4). Partly because of the complicated nature of the self, the 
discourse pivoted and replaced the main definition of ethos with that of source credibility. 
In 1953, the early work of Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelly proposes an 
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ethos similar to Aristotle’s but emphasized a speaker’s intentions, expertness, and 
trustworthiness. Roderick Hart broadens the list of ethos’ attributes, proposing power, 
competence, trustworthiness, goodwill, idealism, and identification as key factors. Recent 
work by Eugene Garver, Hannah Arendt, and others return to the problem of 
dissimulation, or the divide between the real and apparent character of a speaker. Garver 
attempts to dissolve the divide, arguing that when the public emphasizes the appearance-
reality gap, they risk becoming suspicious of ethos by any definition.  
For some scholars, the weight given to source credibility muddied the concept of 
ethos. George E. Yoos contends that the “measuring procedures used in…experimental 
investigations” of ethos focus so heavily of credibility that they limited a scholar’s 
understanding of ethos (47). Furthermore, while the definitions used by Hovland, Janis, 
and Kelly and Hart do have elements that can be considered somewhat moral, neither 
present attributes that match the fullness of aretê as a moral appeal. In response, Yoos 
and other scholars encourage a revisiting of ethos, working to put “ethics back in to 
‘ethical appeal’” (54; Corder). Attempting to identify central attributes of an ethical 
appeal, Yoos reveals four factors—mutual agreement, rational autonomy, equality, and 
value—with the last being to most closely associated with morality (50-53). And while 
this work has attracted considerable attention, not all of it has been positive. Susan C. 
Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds express concern, saying, “Yoos seems to want to bracket off 
the embodied speaker, with all the confusing emotions and desires that he or she arouses, 
from judgements about the speaker” (41). Their critique, however, is not with the revival 
of ethics, but rather with the understanding of the nature of the self.  
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While there are many nutrients in conversations that reconceptualize, there is the 
inevitable risk of rehashing the same concerns and qualms about the nature of the self 
time and time again. Despite the benefit of the discussion, we cannot be the post-
modernists and the sophists before them. However, some change must be made as our 
current conception of ethos neglects certain voices and limits the range of discussions we 
can have regarding appeals to character. We have an opportunity to continue Yoos’ 
revival work in such a way that fortifies our understanding of the appeal and provides 
students with the full spectrum of ethos that speaks to the complexity of contemporary 
occasions.  
Rethinking Aretê 
In order to anchor our revival of ethos, we will explore how the component 
known as aretê invites rhetorical analyses and examinations of a speaker’s presented 
moral character. A brief overview of aretê provides the theoretical framework for the 
concept and demonstrates the common lineage that links aretê to contemporary iterations 
of morality and virtue. As an extension of this framework, we will then emphasize the 
public quality of aretê, connecting it to agôn and the early sophistic debates. Knowing 
aretê’s moral lineage provides an opportunity to develop aretê into a tool for the 
classroom that engages students in aretiac discussions of public discourse. 
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the rhetorician divides ethos into three components: 
phronesis, eunoia, and aretê—the last of which is typically translated as excellence of 
character. At the beginning of its history, ancient Greeks used aretê to describe the 
maximum ability and effectiveness of a person’s existence (Liddell and Scott). 
Frequently associated with bravery, but more often with effectiveness, aretê is the perfect 
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realization of an objects existence. This term could be applied to any number of things—
a lion exhibits aretê if it is very good at being a lion and a woman demonstrates aretê if 
she is very good at being a woman. Early on, Homer and others used the term to describe 
a kind of goodness or excellence, often associated with the gods (9.498, 15.642, 20.411; 
Herodotus 1.176, 8.92; Aristotle 1106a15).  
Over time, the use of aretê shifts and comes to mean a code of values or moral 
standards that one must maintain in order to be a good citizen. Plato and other’s uses of 
aretê represent “moral virtue”—an ethical knowledge that is distinct from both 
intellectual or theological excellence ( “Laws” 963a; Republic 500d; The Apology of 
Socrates 18a; Xenophon 2.1.21). Morality comes from the 4th century Latin moralitas, 
meaning ethical character or behavior (“Morality”). Virtue has similar Latin roots, 
coming from virtus, meaning particular excellence of character, morality, or goodness 
(“Virtue”). While “morality” and “virtue” have become distinct words, they are often 
defined using each other, and for the purpose of this research, aretê, morality, and virtue 
will all be used interchangeably to represent the ethical qualities one must possess in 
order to demonstrate good character.  
Aretê and Agôn 
A conceptual understanding of aretê perhaps begins best with an auxiliary 
journey into agôn, a kind of competition often associated with athletics but one that also 
informed the practices of early rhetoricians. While the goal of most competitions is to 
crown one participant a champion, agôn is different in that it emphasizes the struggle that 
occurs during an event over the victory itself. The Olympic Games, for example, 
celebrated the gathering of athletes, judges, and spectators—the encounter rather than the 
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division of two sides. As Debra Hawhee says, agôn suggests, “movement through 
struggle, a productive training practice wherein subjective production takes place through 
the encounter itself”(186). And though the concept is often associated with athletics, 
agonism created a model that early rhetoricians used as they developed and trained for 
their art (Poulakos 35). 
Agonism, then, functions as a kind venue for aretê, where an athlete’s goodness, 
courage, and skill are on display. One of the earliest depictions of aretê is Homer’s 
Achilles, who is described as “strong,” “swift,” and “godlike” (1.129; 1.140). He is a 
stunning warrior, being “the best of the Achaeans” (16.279). But simply possessing these 
characteristics does not demonstrate Achilles’s aretê. As David Cohen points out, 
Athenian virtue relies on public opinion, “whose poles are honor and shame.” 
Conceptually, aretê is tied to honor, and so it functions as an external phenomenon 
dependent on external acknowledgement for its materialization. In other words, one 
cannot just be virtuous, one becomes virtuous by performing and personifying moral 
actions in public settings. As Hawhee states, “In ancient Greece, one is what one does—
or better, what one is perceived as doing” (190). Aretê becomes a performative 
phenomenon, dependent on visibility and external acknowledgement. 
A common way to encourage that outside validation was to erect statues in the 
names of athletes and other celebrated men. Joseph M. Bryant points out that mythical 
and historical warriors served as exemplar of aretê, given their bodily strength and 
readiness for battle. Their statues not only served as beacons for the public’s perception, 
constantly testifying of the celebrated figure’s excellence, but the craftsmanship needed 
to render the human form so accurately also modeled aretê for their beholders (28). This 
  
 
27 
is no surprise as the ancient Athenian culture inextricably tied physical beauty and moral 
superiority (Vernant 28). These statues served to simulate the bodies of the gods and 
exhibit “stature, breadth, presence, speed of leg, strength of arm, freshness of 
complexion, and a relaxation, suppleness and agility of limbs” (28). Not surprisingly, the 
gods most connected to athletics sported the most bodily aretê: Apollo, Hermes, and 
Heracles were often invoked by sculptors. The physical characteristics suggested a 
capacity for the agôn and could “be read upon [the body] like marks that attest to what a 
man is and what he is worth.” These “divine superbodies” radiated excellence and 
constituted what Aristotle called sômatos aretas, the virtue of the body (Vernant 28; 
1360b4). 
Rhetorical Aretê 
Rhetorical aretê runs a parallel path to bodily aretê, beginning with agonism 
bleeding over into other aspects of Greek life, with the concepts permeating the realms of 
drama, poetry, and music. Soon, agonism emerges in rhetoric, with the sophistic school 
gathering forces together to depict the “athlete in a contest of words rather than to declare 
a victor of the debate (Plato 231e). Aretê informs this agonistic perspective, as the Greeks 
sought after the esteem of others through competitive engagement, whether it was “skill 
at javelin throwing or delivery of encomium” (Hawhee 187). 
In sophistic rhetoric, agonistic philosophy emerges as a discursive practice 
through which orators can demonstrate their character and virtue. Protagoras was among 
the first to incorporate the competitive debates into rhetorical curriculum, controversially 
claiming to teach aretê to his students. Plato depicts the sophist asserting, “I have shown 
you by both fable and argument that aretê is teachable” (328c). In that same dialogue, 
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Protagoras continues, saying that aretê comes through repeated attempts at moral 
behavior: “every day you will constantly improve more and more” (318a-b). Rhetorical 
aretê parallels athletic aretê in that it is also dependent upon the perception of others, and 
therefore, it only transpires in relation to others and to particular actions.  
Plato opposes their idea that aretê can be taught—arguing instead that aretê is 
tied to the circumstances of one’s birth. Additionally, the goal of rhetoric then is not to 
demonstrate aretê in the struggle but rather to pass along the principles of aretê one has 
uncovered. For Plato, the pursuit of pure truth as a key component of rhetoric, which 
drastically contrasts the beliefs of the sophists. Throughout many of Plato’s dialogues, he 
explores the connection between what seems to be morally true and what actually is 
morally true. To Plato, the purpose of rhetoric is not to manipulate and deceive others but 
rather to educate others on the principles progress and improvement.  
To update aretê for the 21st century, we turn to contemporary psychologists and 
anthropologists who have undertaken the tremendous task of examining innate human 
morality. Recent works by Richard Shweder, Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, and others 
propose the Moral Foundations Theory and provide quantitative measurements that 
suggest five foundations of an innate, universal morality. Their work creates new 
potential for the study of ethos as a rhetorical appeal and a special opportunity revive the 
particular moral portion of ethos, aretê, that has fallen from the discourse. 
Incorporating Morality 
Morality has, for some, become a difficult term, one especially unattractive in 
evaluating the thoughts and actions of others. Indeed, it has become an ambiguous term, 
lacking a distinct and applicable definition. Other elements of rhetoric, such as kairos or 
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energeia, seem to be more concrete, so it is easier to trace and evaluate their use. But, as 
literary theorist John Gardner states, to avoid evaluative discussions because of 
morality’s indefiniteness “is to treat art as a plaything” not worthy of serious discussion 
(8). Gardner defends a discussion of morality, continuing that “[morality] may not really 
legislate for humanity—an idea still worth trying—but whether it is heard or not, it is 
civilization’s single most significant device for learning what must be affirmed and what 
must be denied.” There are a number of arguments that wrestle with the existence of a 
universal morality, and regardless of which side of the discussion we are on, we can 
acknowledge that a belief in morality can elicit change (Booth 25). If virtue and similar 
values inform our decisions, which is the assumption of this essay, then we must establish 
a definition for morality with which we can study its progression and use.  
In trying to universally define morality, we must first acknowledge that, 
unavoidably, we will exclude certain individual definitions of the term from our 
argument. Unfortunately, this is a needed exclusion if we are to venture into any 
discussion of morality, lest we continue asking “whose ethics? whose morality? whose 
standards of propriety? whose community? whose censors? whose judges?” endlessly 
(Oates 239). While the particulars may vary, morality seems concerned with the progress 
of humanity. This seems to resonate with Aristotle, who offers the following analogy: 
And although sailors differ from each other in function…the most exact definition 
of their excellence will be special to each, yet there will also be a common 
definition of excellence that will apply alike to all of them; for security of 
navigation is the business of them all, since each sailor aims at that. (qtd. in Atwill 
79) 
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Just as the sailors represent individual and group interests, a universal morality does the 
same.  
Stephen Pinker has, perhaps, one of the simplest definitions. The cognitive 
psychologist, linguist, and author says that morality is “what gives each of us the sense 
that we are worthy human beings” (“The Moral Instinct”). Gardner expands on this idea, 
saying that if morality “means nothing more than doing what is unselfish, helpful, kind, 
and noble-hearted…whether or not it was against some petty human law,” then morality 
is any action that affirms life (6). Gregory Vlastos defines morality more objectively with 
the terms harmonia and isonomia, which he says represent the idea of harmony and order 
in equal and unequal situations, adding an element of justice and mercy to our definition 
(qtd. in Atwill 77).  
The distinct characterization of morality may vary from person to person, but the 
common thread through each of these definitions is that morality is explicitly connected 
to the pursuit of excellence that we see in aretê as well. If aretê and similar values inform 
our decisions, which is the assumption of this research, then we must establish a lexis for 
morality with which we can study its progression and use.  
The Moral Foundation Theory 
Even if the value of morality’s presence in rhetoric has waxed and waned, its use 
as a rhetorical tool has been consistent throughout the canon. However, we are lacking a 
language to use when discussing these moral appeals. To assists our examination of 
moral petitions, we turn to contemporary psychologists and anthropologists who have 
undertaken the tremendous task of examining innate morality (Brown; Haidt and Joseph). 
  
 
31 
Their work gives rise to five foundations of morality7: safety, sanctity, community, 
authority, and fairness, which supplements the initial idea that morality is an appeal to the 
improvement of one’s life and the lives of others. These foundations inform our 
discussion of moral appeals, affording us the ability to see how speakers use morality as a 
nuanced technique. 
Appeal for safety. 
Rhetoricians will often use a specific appeal for safety to protect people who 
cannot protect themselves. For Fredrick Douglass, this appeal became a mainstay of his 
work as he advocates for those who are powerless against their oppressors. In an excerpt 
from Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, he offers the following account: 
[Mr. Thomas] owned two slaves. Their names were Henrietta and Mary…. Of all 
the mangled and emaciated creatures I’ve ever looked upon, these two were the 
most so…. The head, neck, and shoulders of Mary were literally cut to pieces. I 
have frequently felt her head, and found it nearly covered with festering sores, 
cause by the lash of her cruel mistress. (34) 
Like others in the same genre, Douglass’s slave narratives depicted the brutal and violent 
treatments of the defenseless, petitioning his audience to protect others from that same 
harm. Often, this style of appeal will present some sort of imminent threat to a helpless 
party. Leslie Durrough Smith calls this “chaos rhetoric,” explaining that rhetoricians will 
attempt to persuade by endangering an entity, “portray[ing] a world where threat, 
                                                 
7 Current research associated with the Moral Foundations Theory proposes several new 
candidates for foundations, including liberty, waste, honesty, and ownership. While each 
proposed foundation shows promise—especially liberty—they have not been 
incorporated into this study since they have yet to garner the same depth of data used to 
support the five original foundations. 
  
 
32 
disorder, fear, and chaos reign” (5). Often, the speaker will then offer his or her own 
solution that saves the potentially harmed party and embraces justice and improves the 
lives of others. 
Appeal for sanctity 
Similar to the appeal for safety, a call for sanctity often protects the innocence and 
virtue of a defenseless entity. Gorgias provides an example of this moral appeal in 
“Encomium of Helen” as he defends Helen’s chastity after she yielded to Paris. His 
argument is that Helen is not an unvirtuous woman, but one blinded by the power and 
allure of rhetoric; thus, the audience should acquit her of all charges (132). By addressing 
her purity, Gorgias creates an opportunity for the audience to commiserate with her and 
agree with his cause. As stated previously, an appeal to morality will pertain to the 
betterment of life, and this technique advocates a better life through the preservation of 
sanctity. 
Appeal to community 
Violations of community are often invoked when confronted with an idea that 
challenges the group's progress. This idea is not dissimilar to an appeal to civic duty 
established by classical rhetoricians like Pericles and Aristotle (Atwill 83). Nina 
Rosenstand connects an appeal to community and an appeal to duty, pointing out that 
they both “emphasize that the morally relevant consideration is whether or not an action 
has an overall positive or a negative outcome” (159). In The Treasure of the City of 
Ladies, Christine de Pizan implements this rhetorical appeal when she advocates for 
women to protect their own community. In the work, de Pizan tells women not to gossip 
or speak ill of each other since this would divide the community and undermine their 
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pursuit of improved treatment. Instead of putting each other down, women should focus 
on creating the ideal environment for the whole group. This style of appeal puts the needs 
of many before the needs of the few, thus fortify the speaker’s audience while also 
protecting the motives of the speaker from his or her own community. 
Appeal to authority 
Rhetoricians create a moral appeal when they imbue themselves with a higher 
authority. This is often depicted as some kind of calling from the divine, evoking a 
certain untouchable nature about their works. Margret Fell exercises this moral trope in 
her argument, “Women’s Speaking Justified, Proved, and Allowed by the Scriptures.” 
She argues that women answer to a higher authority than man, and are able to speak for 
God if they are so prompted. Fell uses various scriptures to prove that women have 
always had a place in religion. As a whole, Fell builds her argument on religion, which 
Leslie Dorrough Smith calls “automatically a power claim…because it asserts that its 
legitimacy comes from an ultimate and unquestionable source” (19). She specifically 
challenges Paul and his epistle to the Corinthians, making significant contributions to a 
discussion that would not possible unless she makes the moral petition first. This appeal 
to authority carves out a space for speakers to present a protected argument since 
opponents cannot often supersede the invoked moral authority. 
Appeal to fairness 
The final appeal, one based on fairness, represents the idea that, for a better life, 
we must strive for equality. Nineteenth-century rhetorician Sarah Grimké hones the use 
of this appeal in the argument presented in Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the 
Condition of Women. When advocating for egalitarianism, she states: 
  
 
34 
If brute force is what my brethren are claiming, I am willing to let them have all 
the honor they desire; but if they mean to intimate, that mental or moral weakness 
belongs to woman, more than to man, I utterly disclaim this charge. (18) 
Grimké later concludes that, until there is equality, the sexes and divisions like the 
previous no longer exist, society will never have the full benefits God intended for it. In 
suggesting fairness instead of aggression, a speaker tempers the audience’s reaction, 
giving him or her greater control over rhetoric and persuasion.  
While there are a number of moral theories we could use, the five foundations of 
morality defined by Haidt and Joseph provide a strong foundation for our discussion, as 
the categories they define have been used in previous lexical analysis (Graham et al.; 
Sagi and Dehghani). And because their research suggests a morality of five separate 
categories, we also incorporate a rich lexis to use when evaluating the works of both 
ancient and contemporary scholars. There is still much work to be done, however, in 
understanding how we juggle these foundations. If virtue and similar values inform our 
decisions, which is the assumption of this work, then we must establish a method to 
evaluate its progression and use. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
9 November 2016 
As I walk across campus towards the TA office, there’s a quiet that hangs in the 
air like fog. Students walk to class with headphones in and their eyes focused on the 
ground in front of them. Footsteps are slow and heavy. I run into Clyde, one of my 
professors, locking up his bike outside the Liberal Arts building, and he offers a soft, 
“hey.” His usual charismatic sparkle has winked out. Instead, just a subdued, “hey.” I’ve 
never experienced a silence so thick before.  
In the TA office, everyone is speaking delicately. The usual conversations of 
sharing project guidelines and teaching notes have given way to tenuous discussions 
about the election results. It’s strange, but no one names the election directly, only 
speaking about “what happened.” By now, a few of the TAs have already met with their 
students, and they share their experiences. Some have felt the strangeness in their 
classrooms but ignored it. Others wanted to talk about it but were afraid to. A handful of 
us are wanting to address it with our students, but a single year of teaching hasn’t given 
us the tools to know how to—or even if we should. “It just doesn’t have anything to do 
with what they’re studying,” someone says. The statement feels hollow to me, as if it 
couldn’t be further from the truth. 
I get to my classroom ten minutes early, ready to talk about the different literacies 
a discourse community uses. My opening slide is already projected on the screen. While 
clusters of my students shuffle to their seats, I listen. They whisper to each other, and I 
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catch bits and pieces. One student has been texting his friends all morning, asking if 
they’re safe. Another student tells her table that she wanted to wear her Trump shirt 
today, but she wore it yesterday and didn’t want to smell. I know I need to teach, but I 
just listen. I am standing in front of the class, and the words won’t come out. They seem 
too flimsy compared to the conversations my students having. In their voices are concern 
and questions. Some are confused. Some are scared. Some are lost in their phones; I’m 
assuming either ambivalent to the conversations surrounding them or checking the 
Twitter for updates. It’s ten minutes into class, and I haven’t found the right way to 
begin. 
A few more minutes pass, and more and more students notice me standing at the 
front of the classroom. The conversation eventually dies out, and I start talking. I tell 
them how it’s been a strange morning. I tell them about the strange, quiet fog I feel, and I 
ask them if they feel it too. I tell them how I’ve been listening to them, and it seems like 
they’re having important conversations. A few students nod their heads, and one shrugs. I 
tell them that I have a lesson prepared, but it seems strange to talk about discourse 
communities on a day like today. 
The student who had been texting friends, raises his hand and tells me that he 
agrees. He tells me that the friends he’s been texting are gay, and they’re scared of what 
this means for their future. He says that he’s gay too, and he’s worried about conversion 
therapy. He’s worried about his community, he says.  
“Mr. Meeks,” he says, “Is this a country where it’s okay to hate?” 
* * * 
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The same vibrant conversations surrounding ethos and moral virtue that exist in 
current scholarship are noticeably absent from our writing and rhetoric classrooms. As 
previously discussed, this is partly due to a lack of resources and partly due to 
convenience. Teachers who do end up incorporating Aristotelian appeals into their 
pedagogy often do so in a reductive way, oversimplifying ethos as source credibility; 
however, this eliminates aretê and inhibits students’ abilities to articulate the moral 
complexity of what they are seeing in discourse that threatens the value of character. If 
we hope to strengthen these abilities, the first step is engaging students in activities that 
surface moral language to illustrate previously unnoticed patterns threaded throughout 
various rhetorical situations. This chapter outlines an empirical, lexical analysis as a way 
of demonstrating how we might uncover moral language for our students and ease them 
into aretiac conversations. The analysis provides quantifiable evidence that refines our 
understanding of morally directed appeals and expands the language we use to discuss 
such complex and nuanced rhetorical tools. In addition to demonstrating the feasibility of 
the framework, this iteration of lexical analysis can help students surface unmediated 
patterns of use in other genres to understand additional conversations that currently 
escape description and frustrate judgment. 
In 2013, Eyal Sagi and Morteza Dehghani conducted a lexical analysis that 
provides a precedent for analyzing morality in public discourse. In their study, the two 
researchers analyzed a speaker’s moral loading, which is the concentration of different 
key moral terms. This moral loading is based on Haidt and Joseph’s aforementioned work 
with the Moral Foundations Theory. In their research, Sagi and Dehghani used a 
combination of the Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD) and the Linguistic Inquiry and 
  
 
38 
Word Count (LIWC) software to perform their analysis. The MFD is a database of 295 
words and word stems related to each of the moral intuitions of safety, sanctity, 
community, authority, and fairness first established by Jesse Graham, Haidt, and Brian 
Nosek; and the LIWC is a program developed to search a corpus for these key terms and 
determine the different types of morality invoked in different parts of the corpus. 
Sagi and Dehghani emphasized their method’s ability to analyze more 
contemporary forms of communication like social networking or blogging, and this study 
extends their research to focus on the discourse of the 2016 election, specifically 
evaluating the way each candidate uses moral appeals to talk about certain issues and the 
way each candidate then responds to the opposition. This allows us to see not only that a 
candidate is appealing to aretê, but when he or she is doing so, which will be valuable 
information for understanding the particular patterns of use that create moral appeals. 
Materials and Artifacts 
Political discourse is a living, breathing thing, with adjustments, responses, and 
actions occurring every day. And what’s more is that our current political discourse 
reaches millions of people in an instant, with many more millions returning to articles 
and transcripts and analysis just days after. The reach of political discourse is 
unprecedented; the first debate between Trump and Clinton broke a 36-year-old record, 
bringing in 84 million television viewers with many more people interacting with the 
dialogue through countless other media sources. The sheer magnitude of the audience 
makes the debates an intriguing and important rhetorical artifact to study. 
Exposure aside, debates represent a continuation of rhetoric’s ancient beginnings. 
Conceptually, these debates function as agonist events that allow candidates to present 
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their best selves—their aretê—in an attempt to sway American voters. The back-and-
forth movement of the debates are the ideal structure for candidates to perform their 
excellence. The debate stage is no different than the sophistic arenas, with the public 
being a necessary component to perceive and validate a candidate’s moral performance. 
This study recognizes, however, that the debate as an agonistic experience is the ideal, 
and that many contemporary debates can be interpreted as antagonistic encounters, with 
candidates working to damn the conversation rather than propel it forward.  
The magnitude of the audience is not unprecedented, but it’s certainly unique. 
However, it is this level of exposure combined with the debate’s agonistic lineage that 
warrants further examination. As we know, aretê is a component of character that needs a 
platform, and the debates are a place where candidates can demonstrate their moral virtue 
to the public in hopes of it being perceived and validated by voters. These debates 
represent a specific place where candidates perform their aretê for millions and millions 
viewers, and so the 2016 presidential debates represent an exceptional opportunity to 
study morality in the twenty-first century, given their agonist heredity and immense 
coverage. 
Furthermore, these debates embody the clearest and most impactful example of 
rhetoric for many of our students. Media coverage of politicians is almost inexhaustible, 
and this publicity elevates the status of the politician. In the eyes of our students, these 
candidates represent the ideal speaker, and as such, they are the epitome of rhetorical 
dexterity—a perception that should not go unchallenged. Additionally, presidential 
debates are also the first time many of our students see how language and rhetoric can 
create significant and lasting change. A candidate’s words have to be carefully measured 
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considering the almost unfathomable ramifications; one need look no further than 
Clinton’s “basket of deplorables” comment for an example. Given the elevation of 
candidates and the consequences of their words, the debates represent an opportunity to 
engage students in aretiac conversations that examine the way morality is performed and 
manipulated in order to sway an audience one way or the other.  
2016 Debate Formats 
Because each of the presidential debates of 2016 varied in format, subject, and 
physical arrangement, a brief overview of each will foreground our analysis of the debate 
discourse. The first and third debates were led by a single moderator who began 
individual segments with questions; the second debate took the form of a town hall 
meeting, with half of the questions posed by two moderators and half posed by citizen 
participants. In all three instances, candidates were given two minutes each to respond, 
and the moderators facilitated any remaining time before moving on to the next segment. 
The first debate took place at Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York, on 
Monday, September 26, 2016. The candidates stood behind lecterns while moderator 
Lester Holt asked them questions. The debate was split into six 15-minute segments, with 
the first two focusing on “America’s Direction,” the next two on “Achieving Prosperity,” 
and the final two on “Securing America.” Holt began each segment by introducing an 
issue and giving each candidate two minutes to respond. The remaining time consisted of 
discussions between the candidates and supplement questions by the moderator. 
On October 9, 2016, the candidates participated in the second debate at 
Washington University–St. Louis in St. Louis, Missouri. Unlike the first presidential 
debate, moderators Martha Raddatz and Anderson Cooper facilitated a town hall format, 
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where half of the questions came from undecided voters and half came from the 
moderators themselves. Topics included universal healthcare, discrimination against 
Muslims, public and private policy positions, tax provisions, humanitarian crises in the 
Middle East, Supreme Court nominations, energy policy, Clinton’s use of a private email 
sever as well as a leaked video where Trump described kissing women without consent 
and grabbing their genitals. The candidates were given two minutes to respond with 
another minute for the moderators to ask follow-up questions and further the discussion.  
The third and final debate was hosted by University of Nevada–Las Vegas in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, on October 19, 2016. The format was similar to the first debate, with 
Anthony Wallace moderating. The third debate was divided into six segments: “Debt and 
Entitlements,” “Immigration,” “Economy,” “Supreme Court,” “Foreign Hot Spots,” and 
“Fitness to be President.” The candidates were also allowed to have two min for closing 
statements. 
Transcripts from each of the three Clinton-Trump debates served as the corpus for 
lexical analysis (Politico). Statements made by each candidate (and not the moderator) 
were divided and then split into two categories: primary responses and additional 
responses. Primary responses were identified as isolated statements made directly after 
formal questions from the moderator, with any subsequent reactions and rebuttals 
considered as additional responses. The complete artifact includes answers to follow-up 
questions, exchanges between candidates, and interruptions, no matter if the statement 
was as short as a single word or as long as several paragraphs. In total, the corpus for 
study is over 40,000 words. 
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The immediate responses were likely the most practiced8, so any moral appeals 
offered were assumed to be calculated rhetorical choices of the campaign that colored the 
moral perception of policies and events and not unintentional reactions. Evaluating these 
statements surfaced how each candidate’s vocabulary colors the moral perception of 
policies, surfacing patterns of use present in the discourse. Analyzing the additional 
responses accomplished two things for the study: saw how a candidate used moral 
appeals in a somewhat spontaneous environment and saw how each candidate responded 
to the moral appeals of the other. 
This is where previous research seemed to be lacking; many studies focused on all 
of the words used to describe an event or issue and viewed the analysis as a whole—
painting the entire event with one color (Andersen et al.; Day et al.; Graham et al.; Sagi 
and Dehghani; Winterich et al.). This type of analysis, however, did not alleviate this 
study’s initial exigency: we were still using blunt language to describe morally-finessed 
situations. In seeing these appeals in dialogue with one another, we illuminate how a 
speaker might use the tool differently depending on the message of his or her opponent. 
Additionally, debates foster a sort of agonistic fluidity of appeals that are elucidated by 
dividing the debate discourse into its two parts—the initial response and the immediate 
follow-up. 
 
 
                                                 
8 This election cycle presents another unique situation as Trump prides himself on being 
more of a spontaneous, organic speaker who rarely uses notes or scripts. Studying debate 
responses gives us the highest chance of analyzing practiced, deliberate language, but 
there are not guarantees that Trump is sticking to pre-planned talking points.  
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Tools 
To analyze these debates, I performed a lexical analysis that looked for moments 
in the discourse where candidates relied on morally charged language to either shape the 
discourse surrounding an issue or to present his or her character in a particular way. Two 
tools were used to conduct this analysis: the Moral Foundations Dictionary and the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software. Previous researchers have used these tools 
to analyze a wide range of texts, including political discourse, but the majority of these 
studies inform social science research and are not directed towards rhetorical 
conversations that are introduced in the first-year writing classroom. This study will use 
these tools to extend their research and examine the ways speakers use morality as a 
rhetorical device to either build their own moral credibility or detract from the character 
of another, situating this conversation in the writing classroom 
Moral Foundations Dictionary 
Identifying moral rhetoric in a text provides a tremendous advantage for first-year 
writing students who are trying to understand the contemporary use and effects of a 
character-based appeal. To date, much of the research that has been able to quantify 
moral rhetoric relies on word count methods that utilize the Moral Foundations 
Dictionary (MFD), created by Haidt et al. as a supplement to the core concepts 
established by the MFT (Graham et al.). The MFD is organized by five summary-level 
categories: safety, fairness, community, authority, and sanctity. Each of these foundations 
can be split into “virtue” and a “vice” categories, meaning that there are 10 potential 
summary-level domains that can be analyzed using the LIWC. Under each central 
concept, there are a number of individual-level variables that consist of words and word 
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stems that trigger the word count software. Asterisks were used to cover different forms 
of a word; for example, “benefit*” captures benefit, benefits, benefiting. All reported 
analyses illustrate the total percentage of words that fall within each moral foundation. 
For the full MFD, see appendix A. 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
This study of character-based appeals and morality benefited from the use of an 
objective method of measuring words in a text called the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (Pennebaker et al.). The LIWC is a computerized lexical analysis program that 
utilizes an internal dictionary to determine word frequencies and classify language use 
into over 70 different categories. The software is often used to identify different parts of 
standard language categories (i.e., articles, prepositions, pronouns), which researchers 
have used to measure the occurrence of emotion in texts, to analyze suicide notes, and to 
predict a student’s final course performance (Alpers et al.; Burke and Dollinger; 
Fernandez-Cabana et al.; Handelman and Lester; Kahn et al.; Robinson et al.) 
To better aide our research, a custom dictionary, the MFD, was uploaded to the 
LIWC so the software would identify and classify parts of a corpus in relation to Haidt’s 
five foundations of morality. LIWC variables were organized hierarchically such that 
summary-level variables contained sets of individual-level variables. For example, the 
“Harm/Care” summary-level variable contained the “peace*,” “benefit*,” “abuse*,” and 
“violen*” individual-level variables. After processing the transcripts for each of the 
debates, the LIWC created an output file that reflected each category as a percentage of 
the total work count. For example, if a transcript received a score of 3.2 on the 
“Authority/Respect” category, this would indicate that 3.2% of the total number of words 
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classified in the transcript appealed to the audience’s “authority/Respect” foundation of 
morality.  
The most recent version of the LIWC software was used to prepare the data for 
analysis (Pennebaker et al.). See Bantum and Owen and Tausczik and Pennebaker for 
more information regarding the reliability and validity of LIWC.  
Procedure 
This research incorporates a mixed-methods approach, supporting the quantitative 
lexical analysis phases with the qualitative coding phase. To prepare the corpus for 
analysis, transcripts from each of the debates went through two stages of categorizations. 
In the first, the transcripts were split into statements made by Hillary Clinton and 
statements made by Donald Trump, with each candidate receiving a new, separate 
document for each debate. The second stage took these documents and divided them into 
a candidate’s primary responses made after direct questions by moderators and any 
additional responses a candidate made during the course of the debate.  
Quantitative Analysis Overview 
For this phase of analysis, the LIWC coded each document according to key 
linguistic moral markers drawn from the MFD. There were two primary streams of 
quantitative data for this study: one lexical analysis of each candidate’s primary 
responses and one lexical analysis of any additional responses the follow. This included 
10 summary-level categories and 295 individual-level markers, as well as a general 
morality summary-level category. Supplementing the quantitative phase was a contextual 
review each triggered word to ensure that a phrase like “in order to” did not count 
towards a candidate’s moral foundation of authority and that loaded words like 
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“corruption” and “lead” were included. This supplemental analysis was performed in 
respect to all five foundations of morality, with the list of included and excluded words 
shown in appendix A. The results were then plotted on a series of graphs to show various 
content areas, including summary-level presence and general moral loading.  
Primary Responses 
As stated before, this study assumes that the initial response by each candidate are 
the most rehearsed, which depicts theoretically unaffected attempts at primary moral 
loading. As an example, in the first debate on September 26th, 2016, Republican 
candidate Donald Trump gave the following as part of a response to how he might heal 
the race relations in the United States: 
In Chicago, they’ve had thousands of shootings, thousands since January 1st. 
Thousands of shootings. And I’m saying, where is this? Is this a war-torn 
country? What are we doing? And we have to stop the violence. We have to bring 
back law and order. In a place like Chicago, where thousands of people have been 
killed, thousands over the last number of years, in fact, almost 4,000 have been 
killed since Barack Obama became president, over—almost 4,000 people in 
Chicago have been killed. We have to bring back law and order. 
In an analysis of his full response, the Republican candidate relied most heavily on a 
moral appeal to authority, with 3.4% of the response containing key words or word stems 
like “law,” “order,” and “illegal.” Appeals to safety (1.3%) and community (.78%) 
followed suite, with no attempt to appeal to fairness or sanctity. This shows that Trump is 
making a deliberate effort to reshape the discourse surrounding race relations to more 
closely align with his previous presented character. 
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Additional Responses 
To expand the analysis, the LIWC was used to examine how each candidate 
responded to the other’s initial attempts at moralization as a way to demonstrate the 
complexity of character-based appeals. The study used the same methodology for 
analysis as before, but shifted to the unscripted, unplanned rebuttals, responses, and 
interjections by each candidate. As an example of this analysis, we can turn to Clinton’s 
response to Trump’s previous answer. In a comparable sample, the Democratic candidate 
relied most heavily on an appeal to community and safety, with .85% of her response 
containing words like “community” or “family” and .82% containing words like “safe” or 
“harm.” While the rest of her use of moral appeals fell below .5%, Clinton did employ 
each of the moral foundations at least once.  
It stands to reason that the last words spoken can give candidates certain 
advantages as they try to shape narratives around particular events. Sagi and Dehghani 
demonstrate this in their analysis of moral loading and the World Trade Center. After the 
September 11th attacks, the moral loading used in the description of the two buildings 
increased dramatically. It shifted how the public viewed the structures. Rather than 
finances, industry, and offices, the two towers were immediately portrayed as monuments 
of American resilience and community. Similarly, as candidates discuss issues, they 
rhetorically fight for the opportunity to morally load an event in their favor. In examining 
the unscripted responses, we hope to capture that struggle to get the last moralization of 
an issue, as it may have lasting influence with the public’s perception. 
 
 
  
 
48 
General Results 
Implementing the process described above, this research analyzed over 40,000 
words spoken by Clinton (19,591) and Trump (21,892), drawn from the transcripts of the 
2016 presidential debates held on September 26th, October 9th, and October 19th. The 
analysis included all a variety of response and sentence lengths, with the longest being 45 
words and the shortest being a single word. Below we see a typical response from the 
candidates, with the triggered words bolded:  
Right now, that's not the case in a lot of our neighborhoods. So I have, ever since 
the first day of my campaign, called for criminal justice reform. I've laid out a 
platform that I think would begin to remedy some of the problems we have in the 
criminal justice system. But we also have to recognize, in addition to the 
challenges that we face with policing, there are so many good, brave police 
officers who equally want reform. So we have to bring communities together in 
order to begin working on that, as a mutual goal. 
In this response, the LIWC paired with the MFD classified “justice” and “equally” as 
invocations of the fairness foundation and “communities” and “together” as petitions to 
the community foundation. Additionally, “good” was classified as a general appeal to 
morality. While one could make the argument that words like “criminal” have moral 
connotation, this research excludes them in favor of words with clear, distinct moral 
denotations as determined by the MFD.  
The quantitative evidence gathered from this analysis addresses two primary 
questions: (1) is morality still present in our discourse, and (2) if so, what trends can an 
updated understanding of morality identify. While the next chapter will explore the 
  
 
49 
answers to these questions in further detail, a general review of the data uncovers three 
intriguing findings. First, broadly overviewing the total moral loading in the debates 
offers an exploration into moral concentration and moral volume. Second, identifying the 
questions that accompanied the most morally loaded responses shows us what topics and 
issues exist in rhetorical gray areas and warrant the most moral reasoning. And finally, 
isolating the five specific foundations from general appeals to morality reveals an 
troubling preference for binary, inarticulate language.  
Given the results of the 2016 election, it may be tempting to view this data as 
correlative evidence and say that moral language is why a candidate did or didn’t win the 
presidency; however, that level of connection is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, 
this research presents a purely demonstrative case, aimed at starting a conversation. 
Moral Concentration Versus Moral Volume 
The first finding introduces two concepts: moral concentration and moral volume. 
For the purposes of this research, moral concentration is defined as the relative amount of 
morally loaded words contained within a particular response. It is a measurement that 
considers not just moral appeals, but moral appeals in proportion with the complete 
corpus. Conversely, moral volume is a measure of magnitude and refers to only the 
quantity of morally loaded words present in a text. In essence, the two measurements 
evaluate the quantity of moral loading versus the quality of moral loading. 
  Observation of the first debate establishes an interesting overall trend, with 
Clinton leading the moral concentration despite Trump leading in moral volume. Of the 
6,341 words spoken by Clinton, 152 were morally charged, representing a 2.29% moral 
loading, and 179 of Trump’s 8,469 words were morally loaded (2.11%). Despite the 
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concentration difference, Trump lead in pure quantity, having 17.76% more morally 
loaded words than Clinton. Figure 1 represents each candidates’ total moral loading 
divided by question.  
 The second debate showed the lowest cumulative moral loading (266 words 
between the two candidates), and it also was the debate were the candidates were most 
evenly matched in regards to moral concentration. Clinton used 123 morally loaded 
words to her 6,115 total words, while Trump used 143 to his 6,975 words, representing 
2.01% and 2.05% respectively. Trump again led in volume, having 16.26% more moral 
loading. Figure 2 represents each candidates’ total moral loading divided by question. 
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Conversely, the final debate represented a reversal of the trend, with Clinton leading in 
quantity of moral loading (153 to 152) while Trump led in concentration (2.36% to 
2.15%). Figure 3 represents each candidates’ total moral loading divided by question. 
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Of the 19,591 words spoken by Clinton, 428 words were morally charged, 
representing a 2.18% moral loading. Of the 21,892 words spoken by Trump, 474 were 
morally loaded (2.16%). While neither candidate demonstrated a significantly higher 
percentage of moral loading, Trump typically lead the moral loading volume, having a 
mean of 158 morally loaded words compared to Clinton’s 142 words, representing an 
11.26% increase in moral loading. The total moral loading through each of the three 
debates is shown in figure 4.  
It is apparent that, in respect to our first research question, morality is indeed present in 
our discourse. A review of the means across the three debates indicate that, while Clinton 
had a slightly higher moral concentration, Trump had a significantly higher quantity of 
morally loaded words. A more detailed investigation of these numbers comes in the 
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following chapter, but this general analysis shows that, by not teaching a revitalized ethos 
that includes aretê, we are leaving our students open to moral manipulation.  
Peak Moral Loading 
Examining each debate’s peak moral loading, or the response in each debate that 
held the highest number of words from the MFD, surfaces the topics that employ the 
most petitions to morality. This peak moral loading demarcates issues that exist in 
rhetorically ambiguous spaces that necessitate exploration through a moral vocabulary. 
Not only are we using moral appeals, but we are also using morality to portray and 
perceive some our most pressing problems. 
In the first debate, the peak moral loading for both candidates occurred in 
response to question five. The question asked Clinton and Trump what steps they would 
take as president to ease racial tensions within the United States, and in their responses, 
candidates used 101 morally loaded words, representing 30.51% of the total moral 
loading from that debate. In the second debate, the peak moral loading for Clinton 
occurred in response to question six, which asked about caring for Muslims in an 
increasingly hostile environment. Trump’s most morally loaded response came after 
question nine, which asked candidates to outline a plan of action to resolve the 
humanitarian crisis in Syria. Combined, these two questions represented 29.32% of the 
second debate’s total moral loading. In the final debate, the peak moral loading for both 
candidates occurred in response to question four, which asked candidates to critique their 
opponent’s immigration policies. In their combined responses, Clinton and Trump used 
74 morally loaded words, which represented 24.26% of the moral loading from the third 
debate. Appendix B provides each question in full.  
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Interestingly, the most morally loaded questions from each of the debates 
mirrored Gallup polls taken leading up to and extending through the election. These polls 
asked Americans what was the most important problem facing the country today. The 
results of the September, October, and November polls revealed that three of the top five 
perceived non-economic challenges were poor leadership, race relations, and 
immigration. It is no small coincidence that our most important problems are also our 
most moral. As we face increasingly more complex and complicated challenges, it is 
essential to develop and expand our moral vocabulary to more accurately describe these 
uncharted issues. 
Specific Versus General Morality 
To develop a more nuanced understanding of how candidates used appeals to 
morality, the responses were isolated depending on which foundation each word 
corresponded to. The five main foundations included safety, fairness, community, 
authority, and sanctity. A sixth general morality category was also isolated. This isolation 
allowed us to see not just that a candidate was making moral appeals, but also how those 
appeals were used in relation to one another.  
During the first debate, Clinton’s three most employed moral foundations were, in 
order, community, safety, and authority, which occurred an average of 4.27, 2.90, and 
2.81 times per question. Clinton’s isolated moral loading for the first debate is broken 
down by question in figure 5 below. Conversely, Trump’s three most frequently used 
moral foundations were general morality at an average of 5.36 times, safety at 4.00 times, 
and authority at 3.27 times per question. Trump’s isolated moral loading for the first 
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debate is seen in figure 6 below. Each candidates least frequent appeal was to sanctity, 
which occurred an average of .09 times per question for both candidates. 
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In the second debate, Clinton sustained community, safety, and authority as her 
three most employed foundations, occurring an average of 2.19, 2.125, and 1.625 times 
per question, respectively. Clinton’s isolated moral loading from the second debate is 
shown in figure 7 below. Trump maintained his most prominent appeals, but shifted their 
ranking, with safety occurring most frequently at 3.00 times, general morality at 2.00 
times, and authority occurring 1.81 times per question. Clinton’s isolated moral loading 
from the second debate is shown in figure 8 below. Again, each candidates least frequent 
appeal was to sanctity, which occurred an average of .06 times per question for Clinton 
and .19 times per question for Trump. 
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In the final debate, both candidates stuck to their three most frequent appeals, 
with Clinton using safety, community, and authority at an average of 4.00, 3.5, and 1.71 
times per question and Trump using authority, safety, and general morality at an average 
of 3.07, 2.93, and 2.57 times per question. Once more, each candidates least frequent 
appeal was to sanctity, which Clinton did not invoke once and Trump invoked an average 
of .14 times per question. Each candidate’s isolated moral loading from the second debate 
is shown in figures 9 and 10 below.  
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Through all of the debates, appeals to safety were most prevalent, comprising over a 
quarter of the candidates total appeals (27.16%). Clinton’s most frequent moral appeal 
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was that of community (30.61%), and Trump relied most heavily on safety (28.06%). 
Additionally, while both candidates consistently favored the same top three categories 
through each debate, Trump demonstrated somewhat more flexibility with a different 
category leading each time.  
This isolation yields two intriguing observations. The first observation is that, for 
whatever reason, the moral foundation of sanctity was all but missing in each of the 
debates. Consistently the least frequently employed appeal by either candidate, appeals to 
sanctity represented less than 1% of the total moral loading through all of the debates. 
Whether purposeful or not, this void seems to signal that we have become so cautious and 
wary of moral language that candidates can neglect a foundation completely. If this trend 
continues, then is becomes all the more important to fortify what little moral vocabulary 
we do have.  
The second finding is perhaps the most significant. When looking at the complete 
moral loading by each candidate—the five foundations plus the sixth general category—
Trump had just over 10% more moral loading than Clinton. When isolating just the five 
foundations, Clinton actually reverses that number, leading Trump by 9.80%. However, 
isolating the general moral category reveals an even more interesting trend, with Trump 
using 127 appeals to general morality to Clinton’s 47—representing a staggering 
170.21% increase. This is not to argue that Trump’s use of the general morality is why he 
won, but it certainly could have played a factor. At the very least, such a heavy emphasis 
signals something intriguing about the type of moral rhetoric his campaign feels would be 
most effective.  
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Classroom Implementation 
This lexical analysis demonstrates what is possible when we take the first steps 
toward engaging students in aretiac conversations in the classroom. Simply surfacing the 
language gives us a better understanding of how speakers used moral appeals, which 
subjects they thought required the most moral language, and which appeals they 
considered most influential to the audience. Without the analysis, these insights would 
not have the same quantifiable support. Furthermore, the initial introduction into aretiac 
language establishes a foundation for more complex analysis and evaluation, as seen in 
the next chapter. 
Given the complex tools used to highlight and categorize moral appeals, this level 
of analysis may seem out of reach for the first-year writing classroom. However, the 
same level of sophistication is not requisite for this type of research. Instead of 
employing tools like the LIWC that demand money and technical knowledge, 
composition students can perform the same level of analysis using no more than a pencil, 
a transcript, and the MFD. Similarly, the search function of any word processor can find 
keywords from the MFD in texts just the same. The advantage of using the LIWC is that 
it allows individuals to analyze a larger corpus in a shorter amount of time, but the 
quantitative value is no different. Hand coding or using complex software makes no 
difference; what matters is that instructors facilitate student interactions with morality 
and present a speaker’s ethos as much more than the credibility of his or her sources.  
Similarly, many of this analysis’s other factors can be adapted to suit a variety of 
needs. For example, rather than search for all five categories proposed by the MFT, 
students may be interested in only one. Or, instead of presidential debates, students may 
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be interested in examining TV shows or classical poems or geology articles or tweets. It 
might even be beneficial for students to study their own writing to see where their biases 
are. Armed with the appropriate tools, first-year students could look for all types of moral 
language in all types of sources. It seems as though the limits of this research are the 
limits of morality, meaning that aretiac inquiry exists as long as morality continues to 
inform and influence our decisions.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
“Two things overwhelm the mind with constantly new and increasing admiration 
and awe the more frequently and intently they are reflected upon,” wrote Immanuel Kant, 
“the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (198). Since the nineteenth-
century, morality has been reflected upon less and less, yet we are still communicating in 
ways that necessitate moral discourse. Morality in any of its iterations seems inevitable 
within the world that surrounds our students; and it, therefore, requires a more serious 
study of how to integrate moral appeals into the lessons of rhetoric within the first-year 
writing classroom. Morality deserves a revival of sorts, reestablishing its value in 
rhetorical studies and redefining its use as a rhetorical device. As we navigate the 
complexity and delicateness of future discussions, we must now seize the opportunity to 
reemphasize morality’s role in the discourse and engage our students in aretiac 
discussions. 
As a way of doing so, this study advocates for updating Aristotle’s aretê with 
current conceptualizations of morality—a move justified by their shared history. Others 
scholars, including Yoos and Corder, have already begun this work, but their efforts lack 
the quantitative potential that complements Haidt and Joseph’s Moral Foundations 
Theory. The MFT not only gives us five distinct components of morality, but it also gives 
us specific vocabulary to define and clarify when and how morality is utilized. Opposed 
to prevalent classroom conceptions of ethos that produce flat, generalized analysis, an 
ethos that embraces a modernized aretê establishes a mature and dynamic framework that 
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helps us better understand the ways in which morality shapes our perception of the events 
and issues we encounter every day.  
A number of other scholars have applied Haidt and Joseph’s concepts to analyze 
shifting political opinions, marketing strategies, business students, and many others. 
However, none of their corpora offer the same agonistic environment that accompanies 
rhetorical uses of morality, which is why the 2016 presidential debates between Hillary 
Clinton and Donald Trump were key artifacts for this study of the ways in which 
speakers employ moral appeals in their discourse. These modern debates echo the debates 
of the sophists, where orators engaged in linguistic competitions to demonstrate their 
character and virtue. Similarly, as Clinton and Trump discussed current issues and 
policies, they also demonstrated their character to the public in the form of morally 
loaded language. The Moral Foundations Dictionary helps us surface that language and 
see how students are being morally swayed without the ability to discern so, representing 
a unwitting manipulation equally as dangerous as the emotional influence teachers 
currently guard against, if not more so.  
As evidence of that need, this study found that, despite post-modern arguments 
that introduce and emphasize moral relativism, morality continues to be threaded 
throughout our discourse. Furthermore, this moral loading is not tucked away in the far 
reaches of our communication, but rather on display to millions and millions of people 
around the world—morality is not just present, it is prevalent in some of our most public 
discourse. Returning to what we know about aretê, this presence should be no surprise; as 
Hawhee argues, public acknowledgment is necessary to foster aretê, and so 
demonstrations of moral virtue are likely to occur in the most visible venues. 
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The lexical analysis previously reviewed provides a way of acclimating students 
to this moral performance, but first-year writing instructors must extend students’ 
preliminary knowledge and engage them in deeper levels of thinking, lest we let their 
budding understanding die out the moment it is obtained. As a second step to reviving 
aretê in the classroom, instructors can introduce assignments that ask students to look 
more closely at patterns and draw their own conclusions from the data. To demonstrate 
the potential of this second step, this chapter offers a deeper critique of Trump and 
Clinton’s rhetoric as a way of demonstrating how students can analyze and evaluate a 
speaker’s moral language. The analysis first shows the complex struggle to both establish 
one’s own character and also diminish an opponent’s, and then uses that evidence to draw 
conclusions about the state of moral rhetoric in current political discourse.  
Establishing Candidates’ Individual Aretê 
We see this as early as the first debate. The first question posed to both candidates 
was, “why are you a better choice than your opponent to create the kinds of jobs that will 
put more money into the pockets of American workers?” Clinton, who responded first, 
replied, “The central question in this election is really what kind of country we want to be 
and what kind of future we’ll build together.” She goes on to discuss fair wages and the 
creation of jobs as a direct response to the moderator’s question, but her first move 
attempts to reframe the question as a matter of community—“what kind of future we’ll 
build together.” In doing so, Clinton tries to build her own ethos by reframing the 
election cycle as a matter of inclusivity and diversity, an area of emphasis for her 
campaign as evidenced by her slogan “Stronger Together.” Additionally, by emphasizing 
community, Clinton is also attempting to show her opponent’s weakness in the area. Up 
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to that point, Trump had intentionally or inadvertently marginalized women, people with 
disabilities, Mexican immigrants, Muslims, prisoners of war, Iowans, and several other 
groups. This is not just an instance of morality; it is a moral appeal that deliberately 
attempts to rhetorically recast the question and the election to suite Clinton’s previously 
presented ethos.  
In his response to the same question, Trump uses morally loaded language in an 
attempt to re-anchor the narrative in a different foundation, saying, “[China is] devaluing 
their currency, and there's nobody in our government to fight them. And we have a very 
good fight. And we have a winning fight.” Rather than respond to Clinton’s appeals to 
community in kind, Trump recognizes his deficiency and re-moralizes the conversation to 
better fit his strengths. He argues that the American people are fighting for jobs, and who 
better to protect them then the candidate who promises to build a wall. He reinforces his 
rhetorical choices in a follow up question that asks, “How are you going to bring back the 
industries that have left this country for cheaper labor overseas? How, specifically, are 
you going to tell American manufacturers that you have to come back?” Towards the end 
of his response, Trump says: 
And look at her website. You know what? It's no difference than this. She's 
telling us how to fight ISIS. Just go to her website. She tells you how to fight ISIS 
on her website. I don't think General Douglas MacArthur would like that too 
much. 
No, no, you're telling the enemy everything you want to do. [Interruption] 
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See, you're telling the enemy everything you want to do. No wonder you've 
been fighting—no wonder you've been fighting ISIS your entire adult life. 
[Interruption] 
Even when he is critiquing his opponent, he is reinforcing the narrative that best 
demonstrates his moral virtue. In essence, he’s arguing that, in order to be an effective 
president of the United States, one needs to protect the country and fight for its people. 
He then demonstrates his prowess and Clinton’s ineptitude to do so through morally 
loaded language. 
An exchange from the first debate demonstrates this complex moralization and 
remoralization that occurs when candidates attempt to portray an issue in a way that more 
closely corresponds with their presented moral characters. The moderator introduces the 
topic of race relations by summarizing the tension that exists between African-Americans 
and police officers, calling it, “a very wide and bitter gap.” He then asks, “How do you 
heal the divide?” Clinton’s full response is in appendix C. Appeals to authority lead her 
response, occurring six times in the words “respect” and “law.” This is expected 
considering the moderator’s initial inclusion of the police anchors the question in 
authority. Clinton had to acknowledge the foundation established by the moderator at the 
risk of appearing like she was misdirecting the audience. Following just behind that, 
however, were appeals to community, occurring in “communities” and “together. Also of 
note is that this community-centered loading surfaces at the end of her response. In 
essence, Clinton acknowledges the question’s inherent moral loading first, and then she 
attempts to shift the moral loading to a foundation that coincides with her presented 
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character. In doing so, Clinton is hoping that the audience associates the solution to the 
racial divide with communities, a foundation that she has built her campaign on.  
In his response to the same question, Trump employs a similar tactic. Taking 
advantage of the questions natural moral loading, Trump doubles down on appeals to 
authority and denies Clinton’s attempts at remoralizing the issue in terms of community. 
His full response is seen in appendix D. Appeals to authority lead the response. Again, 
this is not surprising given the natural moral loading of the issue, but what is interesting, 
however, is the magnitude of this appeal, occurring 13 times in the form of “law,” 
“order,” and “illegal.” Similar to the way Clinton opened the debate, Trump begins his 
response by reframing the problem an issue of authority. He begins with “law and order” 
and repeats the phrase four other times in his response. Given that both “law” and “order” 
fall into the authority foundation, this is a potent phrase for him. His opponent’s preferred 
foundation of community appears three times, and one of those times has authoritarian 
connotations (e.g., “police group”). While Clinton is trying to pull the dominate 
moralization towards the foundation of community, Trump pulls back towards the realm 
of authority, which better accentuates his demonstrated moral character.  
In the second debate, candidates continued using morally loaded language in 
order to remoralize an issue in way that more closely aligns with their presented moral 
personas. To open the event, an audience member expresses her belief that the last debate 
“could have been rated as [mature audiences]” and then asks, “knowing that educators 
assign viewing the presidential debates as students’ homework, do you feel you are 
modeling appropriate and positive behavior for today's youth?” The questions itself 
directly inquires about each candidates character, with appropriateness being an 
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extension of aretê and the fitness for the occasion. Additionally, because the question 
asks generally about the character of each candidate, there is no specific inherent moral 
loading, and Clinton and Trump have essentially a blank canvas to paint with whichever 
moral foundation they desire. Clinton, who answered first, offered the response shown in 
appendix E. 
In her response, Clinton reinforces the general moral loading of this question, 
saying “our country really is great because we are good,” with “good” invoking the 
audiences moral mindset. After, Clinton responds to the question of appropriateness by 
again demonstrating her competence in the community. She uses inclusive language like 
“we,” “us,” and “our” that primes the audience for the community-oriented loading that 
finishes her response through the repeated use of “together.” And to show that her 
persona matches up the with standards of community she just established, Clinton 
reminds the audience of her campaign slogan: stronger together. When given the 
opportunity to direct the moral loading to her advantage, Clinton argues that a good 
candidate needs to be a part of the community, a deliberate decision she reinforces with 
community-oriented language. 
Responding to the same question, seen in appendix F, Trump does not take 
advantage of the neutral moral loading as much as Clinton’s did, instead offering a much 
more general answer, with no foundation really distinguishing itself from the others. He 
does, however, seem to be making a small attempt at appealing to authority, employing 
“law,” “order,” and “respect” repeatedly. Based on the language in his response, the 
audience is lead to believe that appropriate behavior for a president is connected to each 
of the foundations, but mostly to authority. Again, this may be a missed opportunity for 
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Trump, as Clinton was able to include more morally-focused language that corresponds 
to her presented moral virtue. 
As candidates use morally loaded language, they are influencing the perception of 
the audience. Or, more accurately, they are inviting the audience to perceive them in a 
specific moral way. As Hawhee states, one is “what one is perceived as doing,” and both 
Clinton and Trump use aretiac appeals to provide the opportunity for the audience to 
believe that he or she has the necessary character to excel at handling the presented issue 
(190). It is the responsibility of the audience discern if the language they use aligns with 
his or her authentic character and not just the presented character. However, with a 
limited vocabulary, this task is nearly impossible, given that the current ethos lexicon of 
the classroom is far from adequate to describe these complex rhetorical situations. Using 
a revised understanding of aretê gives students a more sophisticated vocabulary to 
describe what they are hearing in the debates and what they are perceiving in reality, 
helping them engage in complex discussions of character. 
Attacking an Opponent’s Aretê 
A second rhetorical strategy uses moral appeals to diminish the perceived virtue 
of his or her opponent. This is typically done by associating the opponent with a negative 
moral characteristic, i.e., harm instead of safety or inequality instead of fairness. In the 
first debate, Trump employs this technique, saying, “But we have no leadership. And 
honestly, that starts with Secretary Clinton.” He establishes a moral deficit and attributes 
it to Clinton in an attempt to negate the authority credibility Clinton had previously 
established. While the previous technique is more defensive, seeking to fortify individual 
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character, this second technique is more offensive, directly attacking the opponent’s 
moral reserves.  
Clinton employs this same technique, saying, “But remember. Donald started his 
career back in 1973 being sued by the Justice Department for racial discrimination.” In 
using “discrimination,” she is not so subtly attacking Trumps attempts at appealing to the 
community foundation. And again, this is not an attempt to build her own ethos as much 
as it is an attempt to discredit her opponent’s. Appendices G and H provide more 
examples of this language. 
As a variation of this technique, candidates often used generic moral language to 
target the holistically virtue of the opponent rather than specific foundations. For 
example, in the second debate, Clinton was asked if Trump had the discipline to be a 
good leader, with “good” connoting a positive moral standard. Clinton replies rather 
flatly, “No.” She attacks Trump’s aretê broadly in an attempt to show that he’s not 
inadequate in a single foundation, but rather a wholly immoral person. Similarly, in the 
third debate, Trump repeated attacks Clinton’s “bad experience” as a way of generally 
diminishing Clinton’s presented moral character. In every instance, Trump is coupling 
Clinton with “bad,” which paints Clinton’s entire virtue negatively. Further examples of 
this general attack strategy are provided in appendix I. 
As we see, morally charged language can be an immensely rhetorical tool that 
speakers use to build up their presented character while also diminishing the character of 
an opponent. Certainly, an understanding of ethos helps us identify these moments, but it 
is too broad to articulate the complex exchanges and efforts of speakers. Using the MFD 
to update our understanding of aretê, however, creates an immensely nuanced component 
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of ethos that surfaces the subtle finesse and detail of a profoundly ethical discourse. If we 
wish to have any mechanism to analyze and understand these complex and complicated 
rhetorical situations, we have to bolster our current language; neglecting to do so will 
leave us with less understanding and more uncertainty as we encounter increasingly more 
complex and complicated situations. 
The Stakes of Morality 
This research was an exploration of the rhetorical power of morality, and the crux 
of the study questions whether or not morality has a place in rhetoric in the twenty-first 
century classroom. Certainly, there was a place for morality in Aristotle’s original 
conception of ethos with aretê, but has that presence been maintained? And if so, how 
can we adapt the classical concept to incorporate contemporary philosophies and 
conceptions of morality? Analyzing over 40,000 words pulled from candidates during the 
2016 presidential debates with respect to a conception of aretê that incorporates Haidt 
and Joseph’s MFT hoped to uncover, first, if we were using morality in our discourse, 
and second, how we were using morality in our discourse. Given the tremendous sample, 
the LIWC, and MFD, we have surfaced answers to these questions, and these findings 
give us a better understanding of the ways candidates use morality in their rhetoric, while 
also discovering ways we can improve our own analysis of their rhetoric as well. More 
importantly, this research demonstrates that, despite its faded emphasis, morality does 
indeed have a place in contemporary conceptions of rhetoric.  
In fact, it has never been more important. One of the first findings from our 
research is that morality is indeed present in public discourse, but its stake is small. Of 
our sample, only about 900 words were considered morally charged, roughly 2.26%. 
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However, despite the disproportionate occurrence, morally charged language appeared in 
every response from every debate. What’s more is that every moral foundation made at 
least once appearance in each of the debates. This suggests that even though morality has 
been displaced from popular conceptions of rhetoric, it is still threaded throughout our 
conversations. 
Additionally, given that character rather than policies rose to the forefront of this 
election cycle, morality plays an especially important role in current political 
conversations. Fitness to be president, an area that typically stacks one candidate’s 
political resume against the other, became an issue of values and trustworthiness. It 
became so important to the American people that an entire segment of the third debate 
was dedicated to the matter, with Trump being asked about sexual assault allegations and 
Clinton asked about conflicts of interest during her tenure as Secretary of State—
questions of sanctity and fairness, respectively. At the heart of one’s fitness to be 
president was a question of aretê: the American people were wanting more than someone 
who could fill the office, they wanted someone who demonstrated the excellence and 
ability that classical rhetoricians associated with aretê. Demonstrations of moral virtue 
have become a necessity for politicians as the American people have increasingly 
associated character with capability. 
As an extension of the first finding, this study also discovered that candidates use 
the most moral language when discussing Americans’ most concerning problems. Aside 
from the economy, Americans said that racism, immigration, and quality leadership were 
three of the top five issues facing the United States in 2016. These categories 
corresponded to spikes in moral loading, which shows that we’re not just using morality, 
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we’re using morality to describe and advocate for our biggest and most pressing 
problems. Dialogues surrounding these issues are often stalemates because of their 
enormous complexity and ambiguity. Without the proper vocabulary, we are left unable 
to accurately articulate the full complexity of the issues: racism is wrong and leaders are 
doing bad jobs. A moral lexicon moves these conversations forward as we are able to 
describe how illegal immigration is an issue of communities rather than authority, or vice 
versa. When candidates employ morality, they aren’t just making rhetorical appeals, they 
are demonstrate moral dexterity these issues warrant in hopes that they will be seen as 
individuals who can both comprehend and navigate the moral fog that cloaks these issues.  
Without using language of community and fairness, it is nearly impossible to 
describe the disorienting hurt and ugliness that accompanied the July 25th, 2015, event 
that saw a convoy of trucks wave Confederate flags, yell slurs, and point guns at African 
Americans attending a child’s birthday party. And without appeals to authority, how do 
we articulate our disappointment in our political leaders’ inability to control ISIS forces 
sweeping through Syria? This moral language isn’t just convenient—it’s necessary. And 
if we hope to accurately explore these complex conversations and others like them, then 
we have to lean into and not away from moral vocabulary like that of the MFD. We need 
to make deliberate efforts to understand and articulate the rhetoric we use and we see 
others using too; otherwise, we will be left frustrated and stunned—not by a lack of 
capability but by a lack of vocabulary. 
These findings justify a new, expanded vocabulary to help students of first-year 
writing categorize and unpack these moral appeals in the same nuanced way we do with 
other rhetorical devices. We see both Clinton and Trump using morally loaded language 
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to exhibit their own character while also attacking the perceived virtue of the opponent. 
This shows is that morality is a key factor in our most public discourse. Additionally, a 
moral lexicon alters the way we comprehend and react to various issues. At the present, 
these issues exist in a kind of rhetorical gray area, where logic cannot help us make sense 
of these problems and we can no longer process them effectively (Garver). Ultimately, it 
is ethos that speaks to these moments, reaching places that even the most rigorous logic 
cannot go; in particular, the virtuous and moral component of ethos is crucial in these 
moments. Given aretê’s importance and power in contemporary political discussions, one 
would assume that our moral vocabulary would be rich, vibrant, and developed. And yet, 
this study shows otherwise. 
Our Disappearing Morality 
To explore our second finding—how speakers use moral appeals—we looked at 
how each of the foundations worked in conjunction with one another. The discourse was 
analyzed in two main individual-level groupings: the five specific foundations of harm, 
fairness, community, authority, and sanctity and the one general foundation of morality. 
Isolating the two groups allowed us to see when candidates were employing the expanded 
and precise vocabulary associated with the MFD and when candidates were resorting to 
abstract, sweeping appeals to a general morality. In this analysis, two intriguing trends 
surfaced. 
A Sanctity Void 
The first trend actually comes from what wasn’t present in the public discourse. 
While there was a somewhat equal dispersion of the five foundations, candidates used 
appeals to sanctity drastically fewer times. While there could be many reasons for this, 
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the simplest explanation seems to be that candidates believe politics is not place to 
discuss purity and sanctity. This is not hard to believe, given that the sanctity foundation 
is largely composed of religious vocabulary, and the United States advocates for a 
separation of church and state.  
Regardless of the reason, politicians are neglecting a facet of our morality so 
much so that the only time they bring it up is when one of our presidential candidates is 
accused of sexual assault. But even in those moments, our classrooms have become so 
adverse to language of sanctity, that students have no substantive vocabulary and they’re 
left unable to name exactly what it is that bothers them. They know that the behavior 
violates some part of their intrinsic code, but because the vocabulary from the sanctity 
foundation is discourage from public discourse and their classroom instruction, they 
cannot accurately describe the violation and work towards a resolution. 
Moral-Immoral Binary 
The second trend comes from contrasting the five specific summary-level 
foundations against the one general foundation. By and large, general morality dominated 
the discourse, occurring an average of 1.22 times more frequently when combining both 
candidates’ responses. Even more interesting is that Trump, who went on to win the 
presidency, relied on general morality 1.8 times more often than he did any of the other 
foundations. He also used the general foundation 2.23 times more often than Clinton.  
Trump’s rhetorical strategy, however, wasn’t immensely complex. These appeals 
to the general foundation largely consisted of words like “bad” or “wrong” repeated over 
and over again. Appendix J demonstrates this rhetoric in two responses taken from the 
third debate, with general appeals bolded. This wrong-wrong-wrong pattern was so 
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prevalent in his speech that it became identifying marker for Alec Baldwin’s Saturday 
Night Live impersonations that year. Members of the media pointed to this word choice 
as a sign of Trump’s lack of preparation and acumen—he knew NAFTA was “bad” but 
he couldn’t discuss the policy in any real substance. Despite the ridicule, Trump provided 
audiences with quick and accessible labels to help them sort through the wealth of 
unfamiliar topics, policies, and concerns. While we cannot point to this factor alone as to 
why Trump won, it certainly could be a contributing factor that warrants further 
explorations. We teased and criticized him for it, but whether intentional or not, Trump’s 
language indicates something very significant about the way we use and respond to 
morality in the twenty-first century. 
An Invitation, Not a Solution 
The unsettling conclusion seems to be that we’ve become so adverse to 
conversations of morality in the classroom that we’ve let our rich, aretiac vocabulary 
become a dead language, with the only survivors being those that exist on a moral-
immoral spectrum. This gives teachers and students extremely rudimentary tools to 
describe fantastically moral situations. When Trump discusses his immigration policies, 
he doesn’t demonstrate the carefulness and subtlety of the argument—he tells who is bad 
and who is good. It’s like describing the Sistine Chapel only using the words “blue,” 
“not,” and “very.” We’re cheating ourselves out of more delicate discussions and more 
accurate experiences simply because our language isn’t strong enough. What’s more is 
that this study seems to signal that we’ve blunted our comprehension along with our 
usage. If speakers are relying so heavily on general appeals to morality, then audiences 
are only perceiving morality in general ways, which reinforces the moral-immoral binary. 
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We are letting sensitive moral receptors atrophy until all we can perceive are the broad 
shapes of character. In essence, we think that the Sistine Chapel is only in shades of blue 
because that’s the only way we hear it described. 
This imprecise binary creates deeply rooted misunderstandings since we begin 
immensely delicate conversations with “moral” and “immoral” as the only way to 
describe them. This binary is inarticulate and ugly. It leaves us frustrated because we 
cannot say what we feel and we cannot understand what others are feel either. And given 
morality’s deep anchor into the soul, these imprecise classifications can only be removed 
with the most transformative experiences. We need better language to describe these 
situations because ethos barely scratches the surface of these deeply ethical arguments. It 
is time to move past binaries and embrace a full spectrum of moral rhetoric. 
In pursuit of this goal, instructors can incorporate assignments that intentionally 
surface and engage students in aretiac language. As discussed previously, lexical analysis 
is an immensely beneficial way of introducing students to specific vocabulary associated 
with morality. To build on that foundation, first-year writing instructors can teach 
students to evaluate sources based on a richer understanding of ethos. For example, 
students currently use CRAAP tests to assess potential sources with respect to categories 
of currency, relevance, authority, accuracy, and purpose. Incorporating a question like 
“what is the speaker’s main moral appeal?” is a simple way to improve the measure of a 
speaker’s presented authority. Along a similar vein, the notion of moral warrants can be 
folded into the Toulmin method so that students break texts into smaller parts that 
encourage them to go beyond immediate reactions to moral appeals and discover how 
and why speakers use different rhetorical strategies in different situations. Furthermore, 
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as students incorporate moral devices in their own work, they can do so in genres like 
personal essays and Rogerian arguments that promote agonistic thought as a way of 
simulating the arena where morality is performed. Surfacing moral language introduces 
students to concepts of moral performance, but instructors must extend that knowledge 
by incorporating a variety of assignments that ask students to respond to particular 
arguments and, ultimately, analyze and improve the arguments they themselves make 
In the past, instructors of rhetoric have adapted in the face of new challenges, 
significantly changing the field and developing more accurate and expressive language in 
the process. We have a chance to continue that legacy by adjusting to new obstacles and 
incorporating new research. Investigations into our current discourse reveal it to be 
present but diminishing, thus making this current moment ideal for restoration. Other 
disciplines have unearthed concepts of morality in tremendously diverse topics, and their 
results have shown incredible promise. Those same threads exist in our the classrooms—
and nothing should prevent our students from seeing them. 
In 1982, Hairston summarized the work of Thomas Kuhn, saying revolutions 
come as a result of “breakdowns that occur when old methods won’t solve new 
problems.” I am not advocating for a revolution, but I do think we have old conceptions 
in need of updating. What matters in this conversation is not that every iteration of aretê 
becomes anchored in the MFD, but rather that we begin to explore alternative structures 
with the potential to improve entrenched conceptions of morality. These five categories 
of morality provide a strong foundation for a moral discussion of rhetoric. They give us a 
lexis to use when evaluating the works of both ancient and contemporary scholars. Yet, 
there is still much work to be done in understanding how we balance these foundations. 
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Just as one of Aristotle’s students learned to balance ethos, pathos, and logos, we must 
also learn to balance these foundations of morality if we hope to ever legitimately assess 
rhetoric in terms of morality.  
We cannot abandon the pursuit of moral rhetoric. In 1932, Aldous Huxely 
shocked readers with the depravities depicted in Brave New World. Nearly twenty years 
later, George Orwell wrote 1984 to warn of his audience about corrupt and immoral 
governments. Just over ten years later, those fictional fears became reality as James 
Baldwin lamented the moral apathy of the country and labelled many “moral monsters.” 
If we do not establish moral guidelines to evaluate these matters, then we lose society’s 
most substantial defense against regression and stagnation. As stated before, this work is 
a revival of sorts, but this revival will not simplify the conversation, however. Morality 
will continue to be as complex and ethereal as ever, but if we wish to navigate the 
intricacy of future discussions with any sort of precision, we must now embrace the 
opportunity to reemphasize morality’s role in the rhetorical tradition. 
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01 HarmVirtue 02 HarmVice 03 FairnessVirtue 04 FairnessVice 
05 InGroupVirtue 06 InGroupVice 07 AuthorityVirtue 08 AuthorityVice 
09 PurityVirtue 10 PurityVice 11 MoralityGeneral 
safe* 01 
peace* 01 
compassion* 01  
empath* 01 
sympath* 01  
care 01 
caring 01 
protect* 01  
shield 01 
shelter 01 
amity 01 
secur* 01      
benefit* 01            
defen* 01  
guard* 01 
preserve 01 07 09       
harm* 02 
suffer* 02 
war 02         
wars 02         
warl* 02         
warring 02         
fight* 02 
violen* 02 
hurt* 02 
kill 02 
injust* 04 
bigot* 04 
discriminat* 04 
disproportion* 04 
inequitable 04 
prejud* 04 
dishonest 04 
unscrupulous 04 
dissociate 04 
preference 04 
favoritism 04 
segregat* 04 05 
exclusion 04 
exclud* 04         
   
together 05  
nation* 05 
homeland* 05  
family 05 
families 05 
familial 05 
group 05 
loyal* 05 07 
patriot* 05  
communal 05 
commune* 05 
mothers 07 
tradition* 07  
hierarch* 07  
authorit* 07  
permit 07 
permission 07  
status* 07 
rank* 07 
leader* 07 
class 07 
bourgeoisie 07 
caste* 07 
position 07 
complian* 07 
command 07 
supremacy 07 
control 07 
submi* 07 
allegian* 07 
serve 07 
abide 07 
defere* 07 
defer 07 
revere* 07 
venerat* 07 
refined 09 
decen* 09 11 
immaculate 09 
innocent 09 
pristine 09 
church* 09 
disgust* 10  
deprav* 10 
disease* 10  
unclean* 10  
contagio* 10 
indecen* 10 11  
sin 10 
sinful* 10  
sinner* 10 
sins 10 
sinned 10 
sinning 10 
slut* 10 
whore 10 
dirt* 10 
impiety 10 
impious 10 
profan* 10 
gross 10 
repuls* 10 
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kills 02 
killer* 02 
killed 02 
killing 02 
endanger* 02  
cruel* 02 
brutal* 02 
abuse* 02 
damag* 02 
ruin* 02 10 
ravage 02 
detriment* 02             
crush* 02 
attack* 02 
annihilate* 02 
destroy 02 
stomp 02 
abandon* 02 06 
spurn 02 
impair 02              
exploit 02 10             
exploits 02 10 
exploited 02 10 
exploiting 02 10 
wound* 02 
fair 03 
fairly 03 
fairness 03 
fair-* 03 
communit* 05 
communis* 05 
comrad* 05 
cadre 05 
collectiv* 05 
joint 05 
unison 05 
unite* 05 
fellow* 05 
guild 05 
solidarity 05 
devot* 05 
member 05 
cliqu* 05 
cohort 05 
ally 05 
insider 
05   
foreign* 06  
enem* 06 
betray* 06 08 
treason* 06 08  
traitor* 06 08  
treacher* 06 08  
disloyal* 06 08  
individual* 06  
apostasy 06 08 10 
apostate 06 08 10 
deserted 06 08 
comply 
07   
defian* 08 
rebel* 08 
dissent* 08  
subver* 08 
disrespect* 08  
disobe* 08 
sediti* 08 
agitat* 08 
insubordinat* 08 
illegal* 08 
lawless* 08 
insurgent 08 
mutinous 08 
defy* 08 
dissident 08 
unfaithful 08 
alienate 08 
defector 08 
heretic* 08 10 
nonconformist 08 
oppose 08 
protest 08 
refuse 08 
denounce 08 
remonstrate 08 
riot* 08 
sick* 10 
promiscu* 10 
lewd* 10 
adulter* 10 
debauche* 10 
defile* 10 
tramp 10 
prostitut* 10 
unchaste 10 
intemperate 10 
wanton 10 
profligate 10 
filth* 10 
trashy 10 
obscen* 10 
lax 10 
taint* 10 
stain* 10 
tarnish* 10 
debase* 10 
desecrat* 10 
wicked* 10 11 
blemish 10 
exploitat* 10 
pervert 10 
wretched* 10 
11   
righteous* 11 
moral* 11  
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fairmind* 03 
fairplay 03 
equal* 03 
justice 03 
justness 03 
justifi* 03 
reciproc* 03  
impartial* 03  
egalitar* 03  
rights 03          
equity 03 
evenness 03 
equivalent 03  
unbias* 03 
tolerant 03 
equable 03 
balance* 03            
homologous 03 
unprejudice* 03 
reasonable 03 
constant 03 
honest* 03 11 
unfair* 04 
unequal* 04  
bias* 04 
unjust* 04 
 
deserter* 06 08 
deserting 06 08 
deceiv* 06 
jilt* 06 
imposter 06 
miscreant 06 
spy 06 
sequester 06 
renegade  
06 
terroris* 06 
immigra* 06 
obey* 07 
obedien* 07 
duty 07 
law 07 
lawful* 07 11 
legal* 07 11 
duti* 07 
honor* 07 
respect 07  
respectful* 07 
respected  
07 
respects 07 
order* 07 
father* 07 
mother 07 
motherl* 07 
obstruct 
08   
piety 09 11 
pious 09 11 
purity 09 
pure* 09 
clean* 09 
steril* 09 
sacred* 09 
chast* 09 
holy 09 
holiness 09  
saint* 09 
wholesome* 09 11  
celiba* 09 
abstention 09 
virgin 09 
virgins 09 
virginity 09 
virginal 09 
austerity 09 
integrity 09 11 
modesty 09 
abstinen* 09 
abstemiousness 09 
upright 09 11 
limpid 09 
unadulterated 09 
maiden 09 
ethic* 11  
value* 11 
upstanding 11  
good 11  
goodness 11  
principle* 11  
blameless 11 
exemplary 11 
lesson 11 
canon 11 
doctrine 11 
noble 11 
worth* 11 
ideal* 11 
praiseworthy 11 
commendable 11 
character  11 
proper 11 
laudable 11 
correct 11 
wrong* 11 
evil 11 
immoral* 11 
bad 11 
offend* 11  
offensive* 11 
transgress* 11 
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mothering 07 
 
virtuous 09 
Words Included in the MFD Words Excluded from the MFD  
Cybersecurity 01 
Cyberattack 02 
Cyberwarfare 02 
Lead 07 
Raped 10 
Corruption 11 
Nasty 11 
Deplorable* 11 
Class—as in yoga class 
Clean—as in clean energy 
LAX—referring to Los Angeles 
International Airport 
Order—as in in order to 
Sick—as in sick days 
United—as in United States 
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Debate 1, Question 5 
The share of Americans who say race relations are bad in this country is the highest it's 
been in decades, much of it amplified by shootings of African-Americans by police, as 
we've seen recently in Charlotte and Tulsa. Race has been a big issue in this campaign, 
and one of you is going to have to bridge a very wide and bitter gap. 
So how do you heal the divide? 
Debate 2, Question 6 
There are 3.3 million Muslims in the United States and I'm one of them. You’ve 
mentioned working with Muslim nations. But with Islamophobia on the rise, how will 
you help people like me deal with the consequences of being labelled as a threat to 
the country after the election is over? 
Debate 2, Question 9 
The heart breaking video of a 5-year-old Syrian boy named Omran sitting in an 
ambulance after being pulled from the rubble after an airstrike in Aleppo focused the 
world's attention on the horrors of the war in Syria, with 136 million views on 
Facebook alone.  
But there are much worse images coming out of Aleppo every day now where in the 
past few weeks alone 400 have been killed, at least 100 of them children. Just days 
ago, the State Department called for a war crimes investigation of the Syrian regime of 
Bashar al-Assad and of its ally, Russia, for their bombardment of Aleppo.  
So this next question comes from social media, through Facebook. Diane from 
Pennsylvania asks If you were president, what would you do about Syria and the 
humanitarian crisis in Aleppo? Isn’t it a lot like the Holocaust when the U.S. waited too 
long before we helped? 
Debate 3, Question 4 
Let's move on to the subject of immigration. And there is almost no issue that 
separates the two of you more than the issue of immigration. Actually there are many 
issues that separate the two of you. Mr. Trump. You want to build a wall. Secretary 
Clinton, you have offered no specific plan for how you want to secure our southern 
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border. Mr. Trump, you are calling for major deportations. Secretary Clinton, you say 
that within your first 100 days as president, you’re going to offer a package that 
includes a pathway to citizenship. The question really is why are you right and your 
opponent wrong? 
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Well, you're right. Race remains a significant challenge in our country. 
Unfortunately, race still determines too much, often determines where people live, 
determines what kind of education in their public schools they can get, and, yes, it 
determines how they're treated in the criminal justice system. We've just seen those 
two tragic examples in both Tulsa and Charlotte. 
And we've got to do several things at the same time. We have to restore trust 
between communities and the police. We have to work to make sure that our police 
are using the best training, the best techniques, that they're well prepared to use force 
only when necessary. Everyone should be respected by the law, and everyone should 
respect the law. 
Right now, that's not the case in a lot of our neighborhoods. So I have, ever since 
the first day of my campaign, called for criminal justice reform. I've laid out a platform 
that I think would begin to remedy some of the problems we have in the criminal 
justice system.  
But we also have to recognize, in addition to the challenges that we face with 
policing, there are so many good, brave police officers who equally want reform. So 
we have to bring communities together in order to begin working on that, as a 
mutual goal. And we've got to get guns out of the hands of people who should not 
have them.  
The gun epidemic is the leading cause of death of young African-American men, 
more than the next nine causes put together. So we have to do two things, as I said. 
We have to restore trust. We have to work with the police. We have to make sure they 
respect the communities and the communities respect them. And we have to tackle 
the plague of gun violence, which is a big contributor to a lot of the problems that 
we’re seeing today. 
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Well, first of all, Secretary Clinton doesn't want to use a couple of words. And that's 
law and order. And we need law and order. If we don't have it, we're not going to 
have a country.  
And when I look at what's going on in Charlotte, a city I love, city where I have 
investments, when I look at what's going on throughout various parts of our country—
I can just keep naming them all day long—we need law and order in our country. 
I just got today, as you know, the endorsement of the Fraternal Order of Police, it 
just came in. We have endorsements from, I think, almost every police group, very—I 
mean, a large percentage of them in the United States.  
We have a situation where we have our inner cities, African-Americans, Hispanics, 
are living in hell, because it's so dangerous. You walk down the street, you get shot.  
In Chicago, they've had thousands of shootings, thousands, since January 1st. 
Thousands of shootings. And I say, where is this? Is this a war-torn country? What are 
we doing? And we have to stop the violence, we have to bring back law and order, in 
a place like Chicago, where thousands of people have been killed. Thousands, over the 
last number of years. 
In fact, almost 4,000 have been killed since Barack Obama became president. Over 4—
almost 4,000 people in Chicago have been killed. We have to bring back law and 
order. 
Now, whether or not in a place like Chicago, you do stop and frisk, which worked 
very well, Mayor Giuliani is here, it worked very well in New York. It brought the crime 
rate way down, but you take the gun away from criminals that shouldn't be having it. 
We have gangs roaming the street. And in many cases, they're illegally here, 
illegal immigrants. And they have guns. And they shoot people. And we have to be 
very strong. And we have to be very vigilant.  
We have to be—we have to know what we're doing. Right now, our police, in many 
cases, are afraid to do anything. We have to protect our inner cities, because African-
American communities are being decimated by crime. 
  
101 
APPENDIX E 
Hillary Clinton Debate 1, Question 1 
  
102 
Thank you. Are you a teacher? Yes, I think that's a very good question because I heard 
from lots of teachers and parents about some of our concerns about some of the 
things being said and done in this campaign. And I think it is very important for us to 
make clear to our children that our country really is great because we are good. And 
we are going to respect one another, lift each other up. We are going to be looking 
for ways to celebrate our diversity and we are going to try to reach out to every boy 
and girl as well as every adult to bring them into working on behalf of our country. I 
have a positive and optimistic view of what we can do together. That's why the slogan 
of my campaign is stronger together. Because I think if we work together, if we 
overcome the divisiveness that sometimes sets Americans against one another and 
instead we make some big goals and I've set forth some big goals, getting the 
economy to work for everyone, not just those at the top. Making sure we have the 
best education from preschool through college and making it affordable and so much 
else. If we set those goals and we go together to try to achieve them, there is nothing, 
in my opinion, America can't do. I hope we will all come together in this campaign. 
Obviously I'm hoping to earn your vote, I'm hoping to be elected in November and I 
can promise you I will work with every American. I want to be the president for all 
Americans regardless of your political beliefs, what you look like, your religion. I want 
us to heal our country and bring it together. Because that's, I think, the best way to 
get the future that our children and grandchildren deserve. 
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Well I'll actually agree with that. I agree with everything she said. I began this 
campaign because I was so tired of seeing such foolish things happen to our country. 
This is a great country. This is a great land. I have gotten to know the people of the 
country over the last year and a half that I have been doing this as a politician. I cannot 
believe I'm saying that about myself, but I guess I have been a politician. And my 
whole concept was to make America great again. When I watch the deals being made. 
When I watch what's happening with some horrible things like Obamacare where your 
health insurance and health care is going up by numbers that are astronomical: 68%, 
59%, 71%. When I look at the Iran deal and how bad a deal it is for us, it's a one-sided 
transaction, where we're giving back $150 billion to a terrorist state, really the number 
one terrorist state, we've made them a strong country from, really, a very weak 
country just three years ago. When I look at all of the things that I see and all of the 
potential that our country has, we have such tremendous potential. Whether it's in 
business and trade, where we are doing so badly. Last year we had an almost $800 
billion trade deficit. In other words, trading with other countries. We had an $800 
billion deficit. It's hard to believe. Inconceivable. You say who's making these deals? 
We're going to make great trade deals, we‘re going to have a strong border, we're 
going to bring back law and order. Just today, policeman was shot. Two killed. And 
this is happening on a weekly basis. We have to bring back respect to law 
enforcement. At the same time we have to take cake of people on all sides. We need 
justice. But I want to do things that haven't been done, including fixing and making 
our inner cities better for the African-American citizens that are so great and for the 
Latinos, Hispanics, and I looking forward to doing—it's called make America great 
again. 
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Safety Fairness Community Authority 
Our country is suffering 
because people like Secretary 
Clinton have made such bad 
decisions in terms of our jobs 
and in terms of what's going 
on.  
 
Hillary Clinton attacked those 
same women, and attacked 
them viciously. 
 
She's the one and Obama that 
caused the violence…. So sad 
when she talks about violence 
at my rallies and she caused 
the violence. 
   But we have no leadership. 
And honestly, that starts with 
Secretary Clinton. 
 
You treated him with terrible 
disrespect. 
 
She talks in favor of the rebels. 
She doesn't even know who 
the rebels are. You know, 
every time we take rebels 
whether it's in Iraq or 
anywhere else, we're arming 
people.  
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He has no respect for her…. 
Putin from everything I see has 
no respect for this person. 
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Safety Fairness Community Authority 
Donald insulted and attacked 
them for weeks over their 
religion. 
 
He attacked the woman 
reporter writing the story, 
called her disgusting, as he has 
called number of women 
during this campaign….That’s 
who Donald is. 
 
This is a pattern…where he 
incites violence, where he 
applauds people who are 
pushing and pulling and 
punching at his rallies. 
But remember, Donald started 
his career back in 1973 being 
sued by the Justice 
Department for racial 
discrimination.  
 
People like Donald who paid 
zero in taxes, zero for our vets, 
zero for our military, zero for 
health and education. That is 
wrong. And we're going to 
make sure that nobody, no 
corporation and no individual 
can get away without paying 
his fair share to support our 
country. 
Donald has consistently 
insulted Muslims abroad, 
Muslims at home, when we 
need to be cooperating with 
Muslim nations and with the 
American Muslim community. 
 
Right now, a lot of those 
nations are hearing what 
Donald says and wondering 
why should we cooperate with 
the Americans, and this is a 
gift to ISIS and the terrorists. 
Violent jihadist terrorists. We 
are not at war with Islam, and 
it is a mistake, and it plays into 
We cannot just say law and 
order.  
 
It's just awfully good that 
someone with the 
temperament of Donald 
Trump is not in charge of the 
law in our country. 
  
1
1
0
 
the hands of the terrorists, to 
act as though we are.  
  
111 
APPENDIX I 
Selection of Attempts to Diminish Opponent’s General Character
  
112 
Selection of General Attempts to  
Diminishing Clinton’s Character 
Selection of General Attempts to  
Diminishing Trump’s Character 
So she has experience, I agree. But it's 
bad, bad experience.... And this country 
can't afford to have another four years of 
that kind of bad experience. 
 
Bernie Sanders said Hillary Clinton has 
very bad judgment. This is a perfect 
example of it.  
 
And again, Bernie Sanders, it’s really bad 
judgment. She has made bad judgment 
not only on taxes, she's made bad 
judgements on Libya, on Syria, on Iraq. 
 
I say the one thing you have over me is 
experience. But it is bad experience 
because what you've done has turned out 
badly.  
 
Such a nasty woman. 
He said, you know, if they taunted our 
sailors, I’d blow them out of the water and 
start another war….That's bad judgment. 
That is not the right temperament to be 
commander in chief… 
 
You know, with prior Republican 
nominees for president, I disagreed with 
them on politics, policies, principles, but I 
never questioned their fitness to serve. 
Donald Trump is different.* 
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Response 1 
One of my first acts will be to get all of the drug lords, all of the bad ones, we have 
some bad, bad people in this country that have to go out. We're going to get them 
out. We're going to secure the border. And once the border is secured, at a later date, 
we'll make a determination as to the rest. But we have some bad hombres here and 
we're going to get them out. 
Response 2 
Look you're not there. You might be involved in that decision, but you were there 
when you took everybody out of Mosul and out of Iraq. You shouldn't have been in 
Iraq, but you did vote for it. You shouldn't have been in Iraq, but once you were in 
Iraq, you should have never left the way -- the point is the big winner is going to be 
Iran. 
Wrong.  
Wrong. 
Wrong. 
We don't gain anything. Iran is taking over—  
Iran is taking over Iraq.  
We would have gained— 
No, you're the one that's unfit. You know, Wikileaks just actually came out. John 
Podesta said some horrible things about you, and boy was he right. He said some 
beauties. And you know Bernie Sanders, he said you have bad judgment. You do. And 
if you think going into Mosul after we let the world know we're going in and all of the 
people we really wanted, the leaders are all gone, if you think that was good, then you 
do. Now John Podesta said you have terrible instincts. Bernie Sanders said you have 
bad judgment. I agree with both. 
 
